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Introduction 
The concept of information as we use it in everyday English, in the 
sense of knowledge communicated, plays a central role in contemporary 
society. The development and widespread use of computer networks since 
the end of World War 11, and the emergence of information science as a dis- 
cipline in the 1950s, are evidence of this focus. Although knowledge and 
its communication are basic phenomena of every human society, it is the 
rise of information technology and its global impacts that characterize 
ours as an information society. It is commonplace to consider information 
as a basic condition for economic development together with capital, labor, 
and raw material; but what makes information especially significant at 
present is its digital nature. The impact of information technology on the 
natural and social sciences in particular has made this everyday notion a 
highly controversial concept. Claude Shannon’s (1948) “A Mathematical 
Theory of Communication” is a landmark work, referring to the common 
use of information with its semantic and pragmatic dimensions, while at 
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the same time redefining the concept within an engineering frame- 
work. The fact that the concept of knowledge communication has been 
designated by the word information seems, prima facie, a linguistic 
happenstance. 
For a science like information science (IS), it is of course important 
how fundamental terms are defined; and in IS, as in other fields, the 
question of how to define information is often raised. This chapter is an 
attempt to review the status of the concept of information in IS, with ref- 
erence also to interdisciplinary trends. In scientific discourse, theoreti- 
cal concepts are not true or false elements or glimpses of some element 
of reality; rather, they are constructions designed to do a job in the best 
possible way. Different conceptions of fundamental terms like informa- 
tion are thus more or less fruitful, depending on the theories (and in the 
end, the practical actions) they are expected to support. In the opening 
section, we discuss the problem of defining terms from the perspective of 
the philosophy of science. 
The history of a word provides us with anecdotes that are tangential 
to the concept itself. But in our case, the use of the word information 
points to a specific perspective from which the concept of knowledge 
communication has been defined. This perspective includes such char- 
acteristics as novelty and relevance; i.e., it refers to the process of knowl- 
edge transformation, and particularly to selection and interpretation 
within a specific context. The discussion leads to  the questions of why 
and when this meaning was designated with the word information. We 
will explore this history, and we believe that our results may help read- 
ers better understand the complexity of the concept with regard to its 
scientific definitions. 
Discussions about the concept of information in other disciplines are 
very important for IS because many theories and approaches in IS have 
their origins elsewhere (see the section “Information as a n  
Interdisciplinary Concept” in this chapter). The epistemological concept 
of information brings into play nonhuman information processes, par- 
ticularly in physics and biology. And vice versa: the psychic and socio- 
logical processes of selection and interpretation may be considered using 
objective parameters, leaving aside the semantic dimension, or more 
precisely, by considering objective or situational parameters of interpre- 
tation, This concept can be illustrated also in physical terms with regard 
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to release mechanisms, as we suggest. Our overview of the concept of 
information in the natural sciences as well as in the humanities and 
social sciences cannot hope to be comprehensive. In most cases, we can 
refer only to fragments of theories. However, the reader may wish to fol- 
low the leads provided in the bibliography. 
Readers interested primarily in information science may derive most 
benefit from the section on “Information in Information Science,” in 
which we offer a detailed explanation of diverse views and theories of 
information within our field; supplementing the recent M I S T  chapter 
by Cornelius (2002). We show that the introduction of the concept of 
information circa 1950 to the domain of special librarianship and docu- 
mentation has in itself had serious consequences for the types of knowl- 
edge and theories developed in our field. The important question is not 
only what meaning we give the term in IS, but also how it relates to 
other basic terms, such as documents, texts, and knowledge. 
Starting with an objectivist view from the world of information theory 
and cybernetics, information science has turned to the phenomena of rel- 
evance and interpretation as basic aspects of the concept of information. 
This change is in no way a turn to a subjectivist theory, but an appraisal 
of different perspectives that may determine in a particular context 
what is being considered as informative, be it a ‘‘thin$ (Buckland, 
1991b) or a document, Different concepts of information within informa- 
tion science reflect tensions between a subjective and an objective 
approach. The concept of interpretation or selection may be considered 
to be the bridge between these two poles. It is important, however, to 
consider the different professions involved with the interpretation and 
selection of knowledge. The most important thing in IS (as in informa- 
tion policy) is to consider information as a constitutive force in society 
and, thus, recognize the teleological nature of information systems and 
services (Braman, 1989). 
How to Define a Scientific Term 
Definition and Meaning Theory 
It is well known that definitions are not true or false, but more or less 
fruitful. In a way, people are free to define terms as they like, but in real- 
ity their definitions may encounter problems. In children’s play, a chair 
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can be defined as a table and vice versa. This works as  long as  the chil- 
dren remember and obey their own decisions and do not apply their own 
conventions in communication with outsiders. However, when somebody 
defines a term in such an  idiosyncratic way, that definition will be 
neglected and will not contribute to understanding, communication, or 
the advance of practice. 
Knowing how different people apply the terms they use is helpful. 
Wittgenstein’s (1958a) famous use theory of meaning emphasizes this 
aspect, defining terms by finding out how people actually use them (see 
Blair’s chapter in this volume). This aspect also applies to the term 
information. Dictionaries such as The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) 
provide valuable insights about the etymology of a word and how differ- 
ent authors have used it throughout the centuries (see Appendix). This 
etymology should be supplemented by more detailed descriptions of how 
the word has  been used in different disciplines. The actual use of terms 
may differ from their more formal definitions. The ordinary use of a term 
like information may carry meanings other than formal definitions, 
implying that conflicting theoretical views may arise between the 
explicit scientific definitions and the implicit definitions of ordinary use. 
Because of this tendency, we must not only compare different formal def- 
initions, but also consider the meaning of a word like information as it 
is used in relation to, for example, information seeking, information sys- 
tems, and information services. 
Studies of how a term has been used cannot, however, help us to 
decide how we should define it. When we use language and terms, we 
perform a type of act, with the intention of accomplishing something. 
The different meanings of the terms we use are more or less efficient 
tools to help us accomplish what we want to accomplish. In  this way, 
according to pragmatic philosophers such as Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1905), the meaning of a term is determined by not just the past, but 
also the future. 
We also cite Braman (1989), pointing out how important it is for infor- 
mation policy to define information adequately, thus applying this prag- 
matic principle of definition to practical policy. 
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Theory Dependency of Scientific Terms 
The kind of activity performed in the sciences is the production of 
knowledge and the development of scientific theories. In this respect, the 
meaning of terms must be considered in the framework of the theories 
they are supposed to serve. In the philosophy of science, Chalmers (1999, 
pp. 104-105) has provided an  important analysis of the meaning of sci- 
entific concepts: 
Observation statements must be expressed in the language of 
some theory. Consequently, it is argued, the statements, and 
the concepts figuring in them, will be as precise and informa- 
tive as the theory in whose language they are formed is pre- 
cise and informative. For instance, I think it will be agreed 
that the Newtonian concept of mass has a more precise mean- 
ing than the concept of democracy, say. It is plausible to sug- 
gest that the reason for the relatively precise meaning of the 
former stems from the fact that the concept plays a specific, 
well-defined role in a precise, closely-knit theory, Newtonian 
mechanics. By contrast, the social theories in which the con- 
cept democracy occurs are vague and multifarious. If this sug- 
gested close connection between precision of meaning of a 
term or statement and the role played by that term or state- 
ment in a theory is valid, then the need for coherently struc- 
tured theories would seem to follow directly from it. 
Chalmers also considers alternative ways of defining scientific terms, 
by, for example, lexical or ostensive definitions. The main problem with 
lexical definitions is that concepts can be defined only in terms of other 
concepts, the meanings of which are given. If the meanings of these lat- 
ter concepts are themselves established by definition, it is clear that an  
infinite regress will result, unless the meanings of some concepts are 
known by other means. A dictionary is useless unless we already know 
the meanings of many words. Newton could not define mass or force in 
terms of previously available concepts. It was necessary for him to tran- 
scend the limits of the old conceptual framework by developing a new 
one. The main problem with ostensive definitions is that they are diffi- 
cult to sustain, even in the case of an  elementary notion like apple. 
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Defining somethmg like mass in mechanics, electrical field in electromag- 
netism, or information, subject, or topicality in information science is even 
more challenging. The dependence of the meaning of concepts on the 
structure of the theory in which they occur-and the dependence of the 
precision of the former on the precision and degree of coherence of the lat- 
ter-is thus made plausible by noting the limitations of some of the alter- 
native ways in which a concept might be thought to acquire meaning. 
Chalmers also points out that the history of a concept, whether it be 
chemical element, atom, the unconscious, and so forth, typically involves 
the emergence of the concept as a vague idea, followed by its gradual 
clarification as the theory in which it plays a part takes on a more pre- 
cise and coherent form. He argues that Galileo was in the process of 
making a major contribution to the building of a new mechanics that 
was to prove capable of supporting detailed experimentation at a later 
stage. It is hardly surprising that-contrary to popular myth-his 
efforts involved thought experiments, analogies, and illustrative 
metaphors rather than detailed experimentation. This situation is 
understandable if it is accepted that experimentation can only be carried 
out if one has a theory capable of yielding predictions in the form of pre- 
cise observations. 
Following Chalmers, we propose that the scientific definitions of 
terms like information depend on the roles we give them in our theories; 
in other words, the type of methodological work they must do for us. 
With regard to the term information, Spang-Hanssen (2001, online) 
remarks: 
In fact, we are not obliged to accept the word information as 
a professional term at  all. It might be that this word is most 
useful when left without any formal definition, like e.g., the 
word discussion, or the word difficulty, or the word literature. 
It might be that the word information is useful in particular 
when we try to raise our professional status in relation to 
other professions; it sounds smart and imposing and gives an 
air of technicality. I find no moral objections to this sort of use 
of words; language is certainly not only for informative uses 
(“informative” here refers to the so-called intellectual or fac- 
tual meaning of a text or an utterance). However, we must 
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realize that the status-raising effect of a word may depend 
precisely on its being used in other fields as well, preferably 
in fields having a high status, like engineering and nowadays 
sociology. The uses in such other fields actually makes [sic] it 
impossible a t  the same time to keep this word as a formally 
defined professional term in our field without some risk of 
confusion; the words force, energy and effect-used both gen- 
erally and in physics as formally defined terms-illustrate 
this situation. 
The word information-and combinations like information 
retrieval, information center-have definitely contributed to 
raise the public perception of library and documentation 
work, which is generally held to be a little dull, dusty and dis- 
tant from what is actually going on in society. Maybe it would 
be wise to leave the word information there, were it not for 
the fact-already mentioned-that several attempts have 
been made to define information as a formal term relative to 
documentation and information work, and even to define it as 
some measurable quantity, corresponding to questions of the 
type: How much information was retrieved by the search? 
The Danger of Applying Persuasive Definitions 
Many kinds of definitions exist (Yagisawa, 1999). The tendency to use 
and define terms in order to impress other people has been called per- 
suasive definition. The definition provided by Brookes (1977) K(S)  + 6I --> 
K(S + 6s) seems to us to serve only such a persuasive function. If we 
agree with Spang-Hanssen that definitions are legitimate ways to boost 
the status of a profession or research field, we must face the fact that 
such use can cause internal confusion and lack of self-respect in the dis- 
cipline. Schrader, among others, has demonstrated this outcome. He 
studied about 700 definitions of information science and its antecedents 
from 1900 to 1981 and found that: 
[Tlhe literature of information science is characterized by 
conceptual chaos. This conceptual chaos issues from a vari- 
ety of problems in the definitional literature of information 
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science: uncritical citing of previous definitions; conflating of 
study and practice; obsessive claims to scientific status; a 
narrow view of technology; disregard for literature without 
the science or technology label; inappropriate analogies; cir- 
cular definition; and, the multiplicity of vague, contradictory, 
and sometimes bizarre notions of the nature of the term 
“information.” (Schrader, 1983, p. 99) 
As we can see, the cost of applying persuasive definitions in IS has 
been extremely high; this approach should no longer be accepted by jour- 
nals and authorities in the field. We have to ask more seriously: What 
role-if any-should the concept of information play in IS? In order to 
answer this question, one must clarify the role and nature of scientific 
theories in IS. We suggest that  focusing on the concept of information 
may have misdirected our field, and that closer attention to concepts such 
as signs, texts, and knowledge may provide more satisfactory conceptual 
frameworks for the kind of problems that IS is trying to answer. When we 
use the term information in IS, we should always keep in mind that infor- 
mation is what is informative for a given person. What is informative 
depends on the interpretative needs and skills of the individual (although 
these are often shared with members of a discourse community). 
Studies and Sources of the 
Word Information 
[A] word never-well, hardly ever-shakes off its etymology 
and its formation. In spite of all changes in the extensions of 
and additions to its meanings, and indeed rather pervading 
and governing these, there will still persist the old idea ... 
Going back into the history of a word, very often into Latin, 
we come back pretty commonly to pictures or models of how 
things happen or are done. (Austin 1961, pp. 149-150) 
The study of the history of a word, its etymology, is not concerned, as 
the word etymology itself prima facie suggests, with a true meaning 
(Greek, e‘tymon) that apparently may be the basis of its formation and 
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use; but rather with the interrelation of its different uses (particularly 
its translation into other languages and contexts), including its 
metaphors and metonyms. By examining the history of word uses, we 
find some of the primitive forms or contexts that underlie higher-level 
scientific practices. This lessens the expectations we may have with 
regard to univocal higher-level concepts, and may help us better manage 
vagueness and ambiguity. To question modern terminology, to look more 
closely at  the relation between signs, meanings, and references, and to 
pay attention to historic context shifts help us understand how present 
and future uses are interwoven. 
The word information has Latin roots (informatio). Before we explore 
this thread we should examine its entry in The Oxford English 
Dictionary (1989, see Appendix). We shall consider two basic contexts in 
which information is used; namely, the act of molding the mind and the 
act of communicating knowledge. These two activities are, obviously, 
intimately related. But when and how do information and molding come 
together? Based on studies by Seiffert (1968) and Schnelle (1976), 
Capurro (1978) explores the Greek origins of the Latin word informatio 
as well as its subsequent development. This historico-critical back- 
ground makes possible a better understanding of the higher-level con- 
cepts of information in the Hellenistic period as well as in the Middle 
Ages and in modern times. Peters’ (1988) view is highly supportive of 
these analyses. 
Latin Roots and Greek Origins 
The Thesaurus Linguae Latinae2 (1900) gives detailed references to 
the uses of informatio and informo in Latin from Virgil (70-19 B.C.) until 
the eighth century. There are two basic contexts, namely a tangible (cor- 
poraliter) and an intangible (incorporaliter) one. The prefix in may have 
the meaning of negation as in informis or informitas, but in our case it 
strengthens the act of giving a form to something, as in Virgil‘s verses on 
Vulcan and the Cyclops hammering out (informatum) lightening bolts for 
Zeus (Aen. 8, 426) or a huge shield for Aeneas (Aen. 8,447). Early refer- 
ences to the use of informo are in a biological context, for instance by 
Varro (11f3-27 B.C.) who describes how the fetus is being “informed” 
(informatur) by head and backbone (Frg. Gell. 3,10,7). The intangible or 
spiritual context concerns moral and pedagogical uses since the second 
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century A.D. that reveal not only the influence of Christianity- 
Tertullian (ca. 160-220 A.D.) calls Moses populi informatory; that is, peo- 
ple’s educator or molder-but in several cases also an  explicit reference 
to Greek philosophy, particularly to Plato (427-34817 B.C.) and Aristotle 
(384-322 B.C.). Several Greek words were translated with informatio or 
informo, such as hypotyposis (which means model, especially in a moral 
context) and prolepsis (representation), but most higher-level uses are 
explicitly related to eidos, idea, typos, and morphe; that is, to key concepts 
of Greek ontology and epistemology (Capurro, 1978). This relationship is 
clearly the case with prominent thinkers such as, for instance, Cicero 
(106-43 B.C.) and Augustine (354-430 A.D.). Nevertheless, these higher- 
level concepts have their roots in the low-level use of these words, partic- 
ularly in the primitive context of pottery as well as in the Greek 
experience of limitation and shining-forth of what we perceive sensually 
(phainonemon). 
Cicero explicitly translates in De Natura Deorum Epicure’s (341-270 
B.C.) concept of prolepsis-i.e., the representations of the gods or of 
things impressed in our souls before any experience (a priori, as Kant 
would say) as informatio rei (nut. deor 1,43). At the same time he uses 
this word in a rhetorical context-for instance in De Oratore (2, 358) as 
well as in Orator, where he explicitly points to Plato’s ideas (orat. 10)- 
in order to describe the active and a posteriori action of the mind depict- 
ing something unknown or helping memory, as part of the ars memoriae, 
to better remember a past situation through the pictorial representation 
of a sentence (sententiae informatio). Several references are to the use of 
informo in a biological as well as in a pedagogical and moral context. A 
particularly interesting one can be found in his speech Pro Archia. 
In  Augustine, we have the influence of Greek ontology and episte- 
mology on the one hand, and of Christian tradition on the other. In  De 
Trinitate, Augustine calls the process of visual perception informatio 
sensus (trin. 11, 2, 3) and he uses the famous Platonic (Theaet. 191d) 
and Aristotelian (De an. 424 a 17) metaphor of the impression 
(imprimitur) of a ring seal into wax (trin. 11, 2, 3). According to 
Augustine, the images or representations of the perceived objects are 
stored in memory. These images do not inform, following the Platonic 
view, the soul (mens) or the rational intellect (intelligentia rationalis), 
but only reflection (cogitatio); that  is, the faculty dealing with internal 
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representations (informatio cogitationis) (trin. 14, 8,  11). Augustine 
uses informatio also in a pedagogical context: Christ is God‘s form 
(forma dei). His deeds instruct and educate us fad eruditionem informa- 
tionemque nostram) (epist. 12). In De civitate dei, he describes the 
process of illumination of the heavenly community (informatio civitatis 
sanctae) (civ. 11, 24). 
Throughout the Middle Ages, informatio and informo are commonly 
used in the aforementioned epistemological, ontological, and pedagogical 
senses by several authors (see Capurro, 1978 for details). The 
Aristotelian influence on the higher-level philosophical concept of infor- 
matio is shown best in the work of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Bussa 
(1975) lists in his Index Thomisticus 66 references to informatio-15 of 
them in nominative-and 454 references to informo. Schutz (1958) dis- 
tinguishes in his Thomas-Lexikon between informatio in the sense of 
“providing something with a form” in an epistemological or ontological 
context and the pedagogical sense of education or instruction. 
Modern and Postmodern Uses of Information 
“The action of ‘informing’ with some active or essential quality” had, 
according to the Oxford English Dictionary “a quite restrictive use” not 
only in English, but also in other modern European languages, and 
references to “formation or molding of the mind or character, training, 
instruction, teaching” date from the 14th century. Probably the most 
intriguing question from the point of view of the history of ideas con- 
cerns the ontological use of informatio-both in the lower-level sense 
of “molding matter” as well as in the higher-level sense used by the 
Scholastics as informatio materiae-which became obsolete not only in 
modern languages that, like English, inherited the Latin word and 
slightly transformed it into information, retaining the epistemological 
meaning, but also, for instance, in German where the word 
Information has actually been used in the sense of education and com- 
munication since the 15th century. Informatio was translated liter- 
ally-first in a mystical context as in-Bildunge or in-Formunge; later 
on in a general pedagogical sense, such as used by Christoph Martin 
Wieland (1733-1813)-with Bildung, a term heavily charged with 
higher-level meaning (Capurro 1978, p. 176). A plausible explanation 
for the loss of the ontological higher-level sense is the decline of 
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Scholastic philosophy caused by the rise of modern empirical science. 
As Peters (1988, p. 12) states: 
In the feverish demolition of medieval institutions in the sev- 
enteenth and eighteenth centuries, the notion that  informa- 
tion consisted in the activity or process of endowing some 
material entity with form remained largely unchanged. But 
the notion that the universe was ordered by forms fell into 
disrepute, and the context of this in-forming shifted from 
matter to mind. Both changes inaugurated a massive inver- 
sion in the meaning of information. 
This transition from Middle Ages to Modernity in the use of the con- 
cept of information-from “giving a (substantial) form to matter” to “com- 
municating something to someone”-can be detected in the natural 
philosophy of R e d  Descartes (1596-1650), who calls ideas the “forms of 
thought,” not in the sense that these are “pictured (“depictae”) in some 
part of the brain, but “as far as  they inform the spirit itself oriented to 
this part of the brain” (Descartes, 1996, VII, p. 161). As Peters (1988, p. 
13) states: 
The “doctrine of ideas,” developed initially by Descartes, was 
central to early modern philosophy, both rationalist and 
empiricist. Abandoning the “direct perception” of the scholas- 
tics-the immediate communion of Intellect and Nature- 
Descartes interposed “ideas” between the two. An “idea” was 
something present to the mind, an image, copy, or represen- 
tation, with a problematic relation to real things in the world. 
For empiricists (like Locke), the stream of ideas was the raw 
material from which genuine knowledge could be built; for 
rationalists (like Descartes), it was a veil of illusion, to be 
pierced by logic and reason. 
Nevertheless, the concept of information ceases to be a higher-level 
concept until the rise of information theory in the 20th century. 
Philosophers such as Francis Bacon (1561-1626), John Locke 
(1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753), David Hume (1711-1776), 
and Thomas Reid (1711-1796) criticize scholastic hylomorphism and 
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particularly the theory of abstraction. Peters (1988, p. 12) asserts that 
Bacon’s (1967) “Great Instauration”: 
criticizes the logicians of his day for receiving “as conclusive 
the immediate informations of the sense ...” Instead, those 
“informations” must be subjected, according to Bacon, to a 
sure plan that will sort the true from the false. Though 
Bacon’s usage may not appear irreconcilable with our own, 
the inverted pluralization should tip us  off that he does not 
completely share our prejudices (we should say “the informa- 
tion of the senses”). In fact, this locution exemplifies a per- 
fectly hylomorphic notion of the workings of the senses: they 
are a kind of matter (wax being a favorite empiricist 
instance) on which objects of the world may leave their 
shapes or stamps. What is interesting here is that the site of 
information is being shifted from the world at large to the 
human mind and senses. This shift requires no break with 
scholastic notions of mind or nature. 
Indeed this epistemological notion of information(s), particularly the 
wax metaphor, was a key higher-level concept throughout the Middle 
Ages. Consider Locke’s (1995, p. 373) statement: “No existence of any- 
thing without us, but only of GOD, can certainly be known further than 
our senses inform us.” Peters (1988, pp. 12-13) concludes: 
Information was readily deployed in empiricist philosophy 
(though it played a less important role than other words such 
as  impression or idea) because it seemed to describe the 
mechanics of sensation: objects in the world in-form the 
senses. But sensation is entirely different from “form” -the 
one is sensual, the other intellectual; the one is subjective, the 
other objective. My sensation of things is fleeting, elusive, and 
idiosynchratic [sic]. For Hume, especially, sensory experience 
is a swirl of impressions cut off from any sure link to the real 
world . . . In any case, the empiricist problematic was how the 
mind is informed by sensations of the world. At first informed 
meant shaped by; later i t  came to mean received reports 
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from. As its site of action drifted from cosmos to conscious- 
ness, the term’s sense shifted from unities (Aristotle’s forms) 
to units (of sensation). Information came less and less to refer 
to internal ordering or formation, since empiricism allowed 
for no preexisting intellectual forms outside of sensation 
itself. Instead, information came to refer to the fragmentary, 
fluctuating, haphazard stuff of sense. Information, like the 
early modern worldview more generally, shifted from a 
divinely ordered cosmos to a system governed by the motion 
of corpuscles. Under the tutelage of empiricism, information 
gradually moved from structure to stuff, from form to sub- 
stance, from intellectual order to sensory impulses. 
Later developments in etymology are partly covered in the next sec- 
tion. Here we will conclude that  the modern uses of information show 
a transition period in which the medieval ontological concept of “mold- 
ing matter” is not just  abandoned but reshaped under empirical and 
epistemological premises. It has been extremely interesting to observe 
how the concept of information is closely connected to views of knowl- 
edge. This conclusion is important when we later analyze the concept 
of information in information science, because it indicates a severely 
neglected connection between theories of information and theories of 
knowledge. 
Information as an 
Interdisciplinary Concept 
Almost every scientific discipline uses the concept of information 
within its own context and with regard to specific phenomena. Can a 
common meaning for this term be derived, or do we have to agree with 
the skeptical view expressed by Bogdan (1994, p. 53)? 
My skepticism about a definitive analysis of information 
acknowledges the infamous versatility of information. The 
notion of information has been taken to characterize a mea- 
sure of physical organization (or decrease in entropy), a pat- 
tern of communication between source and receiver, a form of 
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control and feedback, the probability of a message being 
transmitted over a communication channel, the content of a 
cognitive state, the meaning of a linguistic form, or the 
reduction of an uncertainty. These concepts of information 
are defined in various theories such as physics, thermody- 
namics, communication theory, cybernetics, statistical infor- 
mation theory, psychology, inductive logic, and so on. There 
seems to be no unique idea of information upon which these 
various concepts converge and hence no proprietary theory 
of information3 
A broad philosophical debate continues as to whether the concept 
should address a knowledge process including, as a necessary condition, 
a human knower or, at the very least, an interpretative system, or 
whether it should exclude mental states and user-related intentions 
(Perez Gutierrez, 2000; Ropohl, 2001). Between these two positions are 
different kinds of mediating theories, including the quest for a unified 
theory of information (Hofkirchner, 1999). This controversy reflects the 
complex history of the term. 
In their seminal book The Study of Information: Interdisciplinary 
Messages, Machlup and Mansfield (1983) collected key views on the 
interdisciplinarity controversy in computer science, artificial intelli- 
gence, library and information science, linguistics, psychology, and 
physics, as well as in the social sciences. Machlup (1983, p. 660) himself 
disagrees with the use of the concept of information in the context of sig- 
nal transmission, the basic senses of information in his view all referring 
“to telling something or to the something that is being told. Information 
is addressed to human minds and is received by human minds.”All other 
senses, including its use with regard to nonhuman organisms as well to 
society as a whole, are, according to Machlup, metaphoric and, as in the 
case of cybernetics, anthropomorphic. The confusion started with the 
abstraction of meaning in information theory (Shannon & Weaver, 
1972). Machlup (1983, p. 660) found that human sciences like psychol- 
ogy, economics, decision theory, and linguistics had adopted the basic 
human-related meaning, asserting it with some restrictions: 
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The requirement of truth or correctness should exclude false 
or incorrect messages; the requirement of value or usefulness 
should exclude messages not helpful in decisions and actions; 
the requirement of novelty should exclude repeated or redun- 
dant messages; the requirement of surprise should exclude 
messages that the recipient expected; the requirement of 
uncertainty-reduction should exclude messages that leave 
the recipient’s state of uncertainty unchanged or increased; 
and so forth. No exhaustive enumeration of persuasive or dic- 
tatorial restrictions is here intended. 
In short, for Machlup, information is a human phenomenon. It 
involves individuals transmitting and receiving messages in the context 
of possible actions. 
More than 10 years later, Kornwachs and Jacoby (1996) edited 
Information. New Questions to a Multidisciplinary Concept. This volume 
displays a general tendency toward what we might call the naturaliza- 
tion of information. In his contribution “Can Information Be 
Naturalized?,” Zoglauer responds in the negative with regard to seman- 
tic and pragmatic information, which is different from syntactic informa- 
tion; that is, from any kind of mind-dependent semiotic units as well as 
functional information whose interpreter can be a Turing machine andior 
any kind of living organism processing neural and genetic information. 
Also in this volume Capurro (1996) defines information as an anthropo- 
logical category concerning the phenomenon of human messages, whose 
vertical and horizontal structures are related to the Greek concept of 
message (angelia) as well as to philosophical discourse (logos). The con- 
troversy surrounding the naturalization of information goes back to the 
work of physicists and engineers such as L. Boltzmann, J .  von Neumann, 
L. Szilard, H. Nyquist, N. Wiener, and particularly to R. V. L. Hartley 
(1928, p. 536), who in his article “Transmission of Information,” argued 
that, because electrical transmission systems have to do with machines 
and not with human beings, “it is desirable therefore to eliminate the 
psychological factors involved and to establish a measure of information 
in terms of purely physical quantities.” 
Warren Weaver discussed the elimination of meaning from the concept 
of information, within the engineering context of signal transmission, in 
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a similar way with regard to Shannon’s “Mathematical Theory of 
Communication:” 
The word information, in this theory, is used in a special 
sense that must not be confused with its ordinary usage. In  
particular, information must not be confused with meaning. 
In fact, two messages, one of which is heavily loaded with 
meaning and the other of which is pure nonsense, can be 
exactly equivalent, from the present viewpoint, as regards 
information. It is this, undoubtedly, that Shannon means 
when he says, “the semantic aspects of communication are 
irrelevant to the engineering aspects.” But this does not 
mean that the engineering aspects are necessarily irrelevant 
to the semantic aspects. (Shannon & Weaver, 1972, p. 8) 
The philosophical controversy about the concept of information in the 
20th century had its origin in cybernetics, because the concepts of com- 
munication and information were conceived at a higher level of abstrac- 
tion and not reduced to the communication of human knowledge as 
expressed by Norbert Wiener’s (1961, p. 132) famous dictum: 
“Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which 
does not admit this can survive at the present day.” This was of course a 
challenge to dialectical materialism. Studies of the concept of information 
from a materialistic point of view followed (Karpatschof, 2000; 
Kirschenmann, 1969; Klaus, 1963; Ursul, 1970). Wiener’s idea of infor- 
mation as a third metaphysical principle was developed by Giinther 
(1963), while, according to Titze (19711, information is not a substantial 
or metaphysical principle but expresses a tendency for order and evolu- 
tion. In his seminal work, Oeser (1976) places information within the con- 
text of epistemology as a key concept concerning the creation of scientific 
knowledge. He explicitly refers to the Latin and Greek roots of the term 
information as well as to its central role in medieval epistemology and 
ontology. Weizsacker (1974) also follows this path, as we shall show in the 
next section. But, with some exceptions, the concept of information is not 
a t  the core of philosophical research until the end of the century. The his- 
torical review of the concept by Schnelle (1976) refers to linguistics and 
cybernetics. Weizsacker develops his views on the relationship between 
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language and information particularly in dialog with Heidegger (1959). In 
a seminar with Eugen Fink on Heraclitus, Heidegger also points to the 
naturalization of the concept of information in biology; that is, to genetic 
information (Heidegger & Fink, 1970, pp. 25-26; Capurro, 1981). 
Conceptions of information within the philosophy of science and analytic 
philosophy, particularly since the late 1970s, are related to specific sci- 
ences, particularly physics, biology, and linguistics. As a result of this 
development the tendency has been to re-humanize the concept of infor- 
mation; that is, to place it within a cultural context. But a t  the same time, 
a search continues for a higher level of reflection in which information 
and communication, whether human or not, are seen with their corre- 
sponding differentia specifica from the viewpoint of the genus of interpre- 
tation or selection. This higher level of reflection means, on the one hand, 
a renaissance of the ontological dimension of the Greek roots of informa- 
tio beyond a restrictive humanistic view, whle, on the other, the modern, 
but now de-humanized, perspective of information as knowledge commu- 
nicated, gives rise to what we could call a communicative ontology where 
not only living beings (other than humans) but also all kinds of systems 
are said to produce, process, and exchange information. This perspective 
may also explain the rise of information science as a science that is sup- 
posed to be related to (computer) systems as well as to human beings. 
The Concept of lnformation in the 
Natural Sciences 
Information is prima facie something that flows between a sender and 
a receiver. But Shannonls definition of information is quantitative con- 
cerning possible selections from a repertoire of physical symbols. It is, in 
fact, as Underwood (2001) remarks, a theory of signal or message, not of 
information, transmission. Shannon’s model of communication (see 
Figure 8.1) includes six elements: a source, an encoder, a message, a 
channel, a decoder, and a receiver (Shannon, 1948). 
Strictly speaking no information could be communicated between a 
sender and receiver, because this theory is not concerned with the com- 
munication of a meaningful message, but rather with the reproduction of 
a selection process. Shannon correlates information-that is, the number 
of possible choices in order to create a message-and uncertainty. The 
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Figure 8.1 Shannon’s model of communication. 
greater the freedom of choice, the greater the uncertainty; that is, the 
information. This concept of information seems, as Weaver remarks, “dis- 
appointing and bizarre-disappointing because it has nothing to do with 
meaning, and bizarre because it deals not with a single message but 
rather with the statistical character of a whole ensemble of messages, 
bizarre also because in these statistical terms the two words information 
and uncertainty find themselves to be partners” (Shannon & Weaver, 
1972, p. 27). 
Volz (1982-1983) gives an overview of the different approaches to the 
concept of information in the natural sciences. According to Mahler 
(1996), information is a “contextual concept;” in other words, the ques- 
tion: “What is information?” cannot be stated without reference to a sit- 
uation. In  the case of quantum physics, this situation is a dynamic 
scenario in which “decisions” are carried out by a system that gives rise 
to an “information flow.” Such decision making, although arranged by 
human beings, does not require conscious observers. Quantum mechan- 
ical systems are embedded within a classical environment. The theoret- 
ical model must combine system dynamics and information dynamics, 
which are separated within the classical world of observation, where 
information can be copied at will. Given the incompatibility of observ- 
ables like location and impact, there is no transmission of encoded infor- 
mation in the individual photons between A and B, local information 
coming into being only after measurement. Mahler shows that this fun- 
damental contextuality can be exploited in communication scenarios, 
particularly with regard to cryptography. According to Mahler (1996, p. 
117), “information can only be defined within the scenario, it is not just 
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out there.” In other words, information is not a pure observable, but a 
theoretical construct. I t  is “interpreted data.” As Bennett and 
DiVincenzo (2000) show, an information theory based on quantum prin- 
ciples extends and completes classical information theory. A quantum 
theory of information offers benefits not only to cryptography but also to 
quantum information processing. A quantum bit or “qubit” is a micro- 
scopic system, such as an  atom, or nuclear spin, or photon. 
The physicist and philosopher Carl-Friedrich von Weizsacker con- 
ceives of information as a twofold category: (1) information is only that 
which is understood; (2) information is only that which generates infor- 
mation (Weizsacker, 1974). Weizsacker points to the Aristotelian and 
Platonic origins of the term to show that the concept of information is 
related to form or structure (definition 2). Information means, at the 
human level, the concept; not the thinking process itself. In order for a 
concept to be information, two conditions are necessary; namely, it must 
be a linguistic entity and i t  must be univocal. A circular movement 
between language and information serves as a precondition of scientific 
thinking (Weizsacker, 1974). Weizsacker (1974, p. 347) stresses that a 
biological structure, or more generally, information as  “a measure for the 
amount of form,” is something that can be potentially known (definition 
1). At the same time, an  entire organism is the product of genetic infor- 
mation (definition 2). Weizsacker (1974, p. 351) calls generating forms 
“objectivized semantics.” Information is a property of material entities: 
“matter has form, consciousness knows form.” (Weizsacker, 1974, p. 167). 
At the level of thermodynamics, actual information means the opposite 
of entropy; at the level of consciousness it has syntactic, semantic, and 
pragmatic dimensions. Evolution is the increase of form. Weizsacker 
translates the information concept within signal transmission into the 
context of thermodynamics and biological evolution. The macro state of, 
say, the Latin alphabet used to send a message, makes possible the 
choice of a specific letter a t  the micro level. The same can be said with 
regard to chromosomes and a DNA sequence. Thermodynamic entropy 
measures the distance between knowledge of the macro and ignorance at 
the micro level. The probability of possible events always takes place 
within specific conditions. No absolute concept of information exists 
(Weizsacker, 1985). Contrary to Plato, information should not be con- 
ceived as  a perennial form, but as changing over time (Weizsacker, 1992). 
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Finally, Weizsacker (1974, p. 60) points to the “unavoidable circlen 
between language and information; that is, between word plurivocity 
and conceptual univocity, as a characteristic of exact thinking. The rea- 
son is that we are finite observers and actors within language as well as 
within evolution. We cannot, in Kantian terms, understand things as 
they are in themselves and therefore we never have fully univocal con- 
cepts (Weizsacker 1992). On the basis of Weizsacker’s twofold concept of 
information, Lyre (1998, p. 76) develops “a quantum theory of informa- 
tion” (Ur-Theorie) with “basic alternatives” (Ur-Alternativen) represent- 
ing the information content of a yeslno decision o r  one bit of 
quantum-theoretic potential information (Ur). Urs are potential infor- 
mation (Lyre, 1998). This idea of information units is prima facie simi- 
lar to Stonier’s theory of objective information. According to Stonier 
(1990, p. 211, “information exists;” that is, information exists indepen- 
dently of human thinking (Stonier, 1997). Stonier follows Norbert 
Wiener’s (1961, p. 132) famous dictum: 
The mechanical brain does not secrete thought “as the liver 
does bile,” as the earlier materialists claimed, nor does it put 
it out in the form of energy, as the muscle puts out its activ- 
ity. Information is information, not matter or energy. No 
materialism which does not admit this can survive at the pre- 
sent day. 
Structural and kinetic information is an intrinsic component of the 
universe. It is independent of whether or not any form of intelligence can 
perceive it (Stonier, 1991). Information may exist in particular form, 
comparable to photons, as “infons” (Stonier, 1996, 138). The term “infon” 
was coined by Keith Devlin (1991) and refers to parameters correspond- 
ing to individuals and locations (Israel & Perry, 1990). Stonier’s view is 
orthogonal to Weizsacker’s twofold conception of information and Lyre’s 
quantum theory of information with its Kantian background. Urs are 
not infons; that is, they are not particles in space and time. Finally, 
Stonier separates the syntactic from the semantic aspects of informa- 
tion, whereas Lyre (1998, pp. 155-156) looks for a “complete concept of 
information.” Stonier’s (1999) evolutionary view foresees the emergence 
of a global brain similar to Teilhard de Chardin’s (1964) “noosphere.” 
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According to Stonier, i t  is important to distinguish between information 
and meaning. Information is, say, the letters of a written alphabet or the 
nucleotides of a strand of DNA. Two moles of sodium chloride contain 
twice as much information as one mole. I t  may yield a message if and 
only if it has been processed. If the nucleotide in the second sequence is 
identical to the first, its message is merely redundant. The message may 
acquire a meaning if and only if it has been information-processed by a 
recipient. The meaning of two identical messages would not double 
“although i t  might be increased somewhat as a result of being repeated 
(Stonier, 1996, p. 137). This evolutionary approach to information within 
the natural (and social) sciences has been discussed at international con- 
ferences on the foundations of information science (Conrad & Marijuan, 
1996; Hofkirchner, 1999). Information science is seen in this context as 
an interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary science: 
As a putative vertical science it creates its own spattering of 
subdisciplines in the overlapping with the other existing sci- 
ences: information physics, information chemistry (molecular 
computing), bioinformation (artificial life), informational 
neuroscience (artificial intelligence), and socioinformation. 
(Marijuan, 1996, p. 91) 
Biological systems are treated as networks in which information 
processes at all levels participate (Loewenstein,l999). The features of 
this autopoietic universe are collapse, irreversibility, and self-regulation, 
where higher levels act downwardly on the lower levels. This circularity 
remains imperfect. The physics of biological life recapitulates the under- 
lying physics of the universe (Conrad, 1996). According to Matsuno 
(19961, information is intrinsically ambivalent with regard to temporal- 
ity. Shannon’s information theory refers to synchronic information; that  
is, to a process existing in a finite time period and ignoring historical 
antecedents. Matsuno (1996, p. 111) quotes Weizsacker: Information is 
only that which produces information. In  evolutionary processes we are 
concerned only with diachronic information. The historicity of events 
does not allow participants to claim a global perspective in a n  atempo- 
ral manner. Within this internalist perspective conflicts among the par- 
ticipants inevitably arise a s  there is no possibility of attaining 
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simultaneous communication among the participants. The duration of 
time in production contrasts with the static configuration within prod- 
ucts. Products constitute boundary conditions for subsequent produc- 
tion. Measurement of products by an external observer is opposed to 
internal measurement of production. Internal measurement remains 
local; external measurement is global. In other words, an external per- 
spective is possible only with regard to what has been accomplished and 
frozen in the record. Matsuno’s question is, then, how an external 
description of internal measurement is possible. The introspective and 
the extrospective boundary conditions must coincide “otherwise, the 
integrity of the notion of boundary conditions would collapse.” The local- 
to-global activity of information becomes crystallized in a product in 
global time while the global-to-local activity makes synchronization 
skewed in locally asynchronous time. “Information is intrinsically a con- 
ceptual device connecting the local to the global.” (Matsuno 1998, p. 66). 
Matsuno (2000) formulates this connection between local and global 
information in linguistic terms: How could the present progressive tense 
be related to the present perfect tense, and how could this relationship 
be addressed in the present tense? 
According to Fleissner and Hofkirchner (1995), the concept of infor- 
mation should not be restricted to a particular level of reality. But, due 
to qualitative changes at different levels of reality, the concept of infor- 
mation may have: 
The same reference in all contexts, such that qualitative changes 
are not grasped. 
Similar aspects between the references. In this case a question 
arises about the primary or basic reference to which analogical 
concepts refer. 
Finally, qualitatively distinct references may exist. In this case the 
concepts of information are equivocal. 
Fleissner and Hofkirchner call this problem “Capurro’s trilemma,” 
which is indeed an Aristotelian one (Capurro 1995; Capurro, Fleissner, & 
Hofkirchner 1999; Fleissner & Hofkirchner 1995). The view of evolution 
as self-organization offers, according to Fleissner and Hofkirchner, a par- 
adigm for dealing with this problem. In the process of evolution, different 
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kinds of low structures generate higher-level structures, starting with 
physical systems through biological systems to social systems. Evolution 
is an autopoietic process in which these systems select possible ways of 
reaction, and forms are transformed. It is a nondeterministic process that 
is not merely ruled by the classic concept of causality (actio est reactio, or, 
“every action has a reaction”), but by the principle: causa non aequat 
effectum, actio non est reactio, or, “equal causes do not have equal effects, 
every action does not have an equal reaction” (Fleissner & Hofkirchner 
1999, p. 209). This second type of self-organized causality is based on 
informational relations. This information concept is related to its Latin 
origins as information, meaning a dynamic process of formation and not 
just the meaning of a message (Fleissner & Hofkirchner, 1995). A unified 
theory of information should give an account of the dynamic process of 
evolution that embraces the whole of reality (Hofkirchner, 1999). Laszlo 
(1999, p. 6) asks for “invariant patterns appearing in diverse transfor- 
mation” during the evolutionary process. Brier (1999) conceives of 
cybersemiotics as an ontological and epistemological framework for a 
universal information science. The evolutionary dissolution of the 
trilemma has, in our opinion, a metaphysical rather than a scientific sta- 
tus insofar as it presupposes a view of the whole of reality that is not 
possible for a finite observer. 
Some philosophers explicitly criticize the use of the concept of infor- 
mation in the natural sciences. As Kuppers (1996, p. 140) remarks: 
The majority of biologists, especially molecular biologists, 
appear to  accept that biological information is indeed a nat- 
ural entity, which expresses itself in the specific structures 
of biological macromolecules. However, this attitude has 
recently been the target of strong criticism from the con- 
structivistic philosophers of science (Janich, 1992). Their 
main attack has been directed against the application of the 
concept of information in non-human areas that are gov- 
erned entirely by natural laws. 
According to Kuppers, human language can be understood as a 
higher evolutionary development of the molecular-genetic language, 
which is the opposite of Janich’s view of biological information as 
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analogous with human information. The use of the concept of informa- 
tion in the natural sciences is a redundant description of the concept of 
causality (Janich, 1996). 
The Concept of Information in the 
Humanities and Social Sciences 
Psychology as a field bridges the natural sciences on one hand and the 
humanities and social sciences on the other. In psychology, the concept of 
information has had a central role, with the so-called cognitive revolution 
from 1956 onward, also called the information-processing paradigm in 
psychology. (This development gave birth to a whole new interdiscipli- 
nary field, named cognitive science, from about 1975. Gardenfors [19991 
reviews the development of this field.) In spite of early disappointments 
with information theory (see Quastler, 1956; Rapoport, 1956), the domi- 
nant trend in psychology has been a kind of functionalism in which 
human cognitive processes are seen as analogous with information pro- 
cessing by computers. There has not been much explicit discussion of the 
concept of information in psychology. (Some exceptions are Golu [1981], 
Hamlyn [19771, Harary & Batell [19781, Harrah [19581, Miller [19531, 
Miller [19881, N~rretranders [19981, Peterfreund & Schwartz 119711, 
Rapoport [19531, and Rogers [ZOOOI.) The trend has been reductionistic in 
the sense that human beings are seen as extracting information from the 
physical and chemical properties of sensory stimuli. Such reductionism 
stands in contrast to more hermeneutic and historical understandings in 
which perception is also informed by cultural factors, and information is 
not defined or processed according to mechanisms in the brain, but by 
historically developed criteria and mechanisms. (Problems relating to 
psychological conceptions of information are also important for other 
human and social sciences, and for the proper understanding of users in 
library and information science. See Karpatschof [20001 for a culturally 
informed conception of human cognition.) 
Information may refer, as Qvortrup (1993) remarks, to a change in the 
external world, and in this case it has been defined as “a difference which 
makes a difference” (Bateson 1972, p. 459); that is, an operational change 
brought about by the external world in an observing system. It may also 
refer, inverting the order of this relation, to the process of finding 
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differences-information as a difference which finds a difference-in 
which case the system is stimulated by a difference in the external world. 
On one hand, information is a thing, on the other, a psychic construction. 
Information as a difference in reality-as something existing indepen- 
dent of an observer-seems to be the view of information in engineering 
and the natural sciences, although, as we have seen, this is not always 
the case. This view was one implication of Shannon’s exclusion of the 
semantic and pragmatic aspects of the everyday use of the word infor- 
mation. According to Qvortrup (1993), Shannon and Weaver are unclear 
as to whether they conceive information as a substance or as a sign. 
Nevertheless, we note that Shannon retains a basic aspect of the 
modern concept of information in the sense of knowledge communica- 
tion, namely selection. When dealing with the meaning of a message we 
discuss interpretation; that is, the selection between a message’s 
semantic and pragmatic possibilities. To interpret a message means, in 
other words, to introduce the receiver’s perspective-her or his beliefs 
and desires; to make her or him an active partner in the information 
process. We would like to suggest a difference between motivational (or 
anthropological) and causal (or natural) theories of information. 
Shannon develops a perspective, as we shall show, on causal theories of 
information with different kinds of “family resemblance” (Wittgenstein, 
1958a). One important resemblance between the two kinds of theories 
is the role of selection in each. Even in the extreme case in which any 
interpretation is supposedly excluded-as in the engineering perspec- 
tive of the conduit metaphor-we can still recognize a process of selec- 
tion. In other words, we state a resemblance between interpreting 
meaning and selecting signals. The concept of information makes this 
resemblance possible. Bar-Hillel pointed to the “semantic traps” of 
Shannon’s terminology, particularly with regard to the analogies 
between the psychological and the engineering fields. Bar-Hillel and 
Carnap (1953) developed a semantic theory of information in which 
they distinguish between information and amount of information 
within a linguistic framework. Dretske’s (1981, p. 63-64) theory of 
semantic information is based on the distinction between information 
and meaning. Information does not require an interpretive process, 
although it is a necessary condition for acquiring knowledge. He states 
three conditions that a definition of information must satisfy, namely: 
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“(A) The signal carries as much information about s as 
would be generated by s’s being F.” 
“(B) s is F” 
“(C) The quantity of information the signal carries about s is 
(or includes) that quantity generated by s’s being F (and 
not, say, by s’s being GI.” 
On one hand, information is not an absolute concept, because we can 
acquire varying degrees of information about a source. On the other 
hand, however, “the information that s is F does not come in degrees. It 
is an all or nothing affair” (Dretske, 1981, p. 108). According to Dretske 
(1981, pp. SO-Sl), information is always relative to “a receiver’s back- 
ground knowledge” (k); it is “something that is required for knowledge.” 
It is indeed a “harmless fiction” to think about a number of possibilities 
existing at the source “independently of what anyone happened to know.” 
There is no false information but there is meaning without truth 
(Dretske, 1981, pp. 171-235). Indeed, “information is what is capable of 
yielding knowledge, and since knowledge requires truth, information 
requires it also” (Dretske, 1981, p. 45). The flow of information is based 
on the following Xerox principle: “IfA carries the information that B, and 
B carries the information that C ,  then A carries the information that C” 
(Dretske, 1981, p. 57). Dretske’s information concept is different from 
meaning, but basically related to cognitive systems. The relation between 
knowledge and information is a recursive but not a circular one. In order 
to learn that s is F,  a person should know about s, without knowing that 
s is F. On the other hand, the information that s is F “causes K’s belief 
that s is F.” “Knowledge is information-produced belief‘ (Dretske, 1981, 
pp. 91-92). Thus, in the case of “genuine cognitive systems,” as distinct 
from “mere processors of information,” knowledge is specified with regard 
to information, meaning, and belief; or, in other words, with regard to 
interpretation during the learning process. Computers have, a t  least so 
far, no capability of using information. It means nothing to them. They 
can only manipulate symbols (Dretske, 1986). 
Dretske’s definition of information does not initially include k (that is, 
the receiver’s background knowledge). This cognitivistic limitation seems 
illegitimate if we consider other kinds of receivers or, more precisely, 
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other kinds of situations. Becoming aware of this contradiction, Barwise 
and Perry (1983) developed situation theory and situation semantics 
(STASS). This theory is based on the idea of regularities between types of 
situations, which allow information flow to take place (Barwise & 
Seligman, 1997). Linguistic regularities, as considered by Dretske, are a 
special case of this flow. 
Information is not a property of facts but it is context or constraint 
dependent. A difference exists between “pure information” and “incre- 
mental information.” “Pure information” is illustrated as follows: 
Whenever there is a state of affairs consisting of some x-ray’s 
having such and such a pattern at some time t ,  then there is 
a state of affairs involving a dog’s leg having been the object of 
that x-ray and that leg’s being broken at t. So the indicated 
proposition is that there is a dog of which this is the x-ray, and 
it has a broken leg. The pure information is about the x-ray, 
but not about Jackie, or her leg. (Israel & Perry, 1990, p. 10) 
“Incremental information” concerns more specific information that 
may result at the terminus of “information flow architectures” (Israel & 
Perry, 1991). A distinction is made between “informational content” and 
“information”: “Informational content is only information when the con- 
straints and connecting facts are actual” (Israel & Perry, 1991, p. 147). 
The causal relations among the contents of an “information system” are 
called “architectural” (Israel & Perry, 1991, pp. 147-148). 
Dretske’s Xerox principle becomes a regulative one: the point is to 
develop information flow architectures whose signals at the terminus will 
contain incremental information with regard to the earlier ones (Israel & 
Perry, 1991). In contrast to Dretske’s concept of information, the theory 
of situation semantics defines information within a realistic and not just 
cognitivistic framework. Information contents are not dependent on the 
knowledge of the receiver, Dretske’s k, but on types of situations. Two dif- 
ferent receivers may extract, due to different constraints and facts, dif- 
ferent information content from the same signal. According to Perez 
Gutierrez’s (2000), further development of this theory-he was inspired 
by the formalization of the information flow through Banvise and 
Seligman ( 1 9 9 7 t t h e  incremental information content may be defined 
The Concept of Information 371 
only with regard to “classifications” or clusters of situations connected 
through channels by which the information is transmitted without any 
reference to a receiver’s interpretation. Based on Wittgenstein’s (195813) 
notion of language games as specified by the formal notion of situations 
as well as on Gregory Bateson’s (1979) ecological paradigm, Rieger (1996, 
p. 292) analyzes the linear (or syntagmatic) and selective (or paradig- 
matic) constraints that natural language structure imposes on the for- 
mation of strings of linguistic entities: 
The regularities of word-usage may serve as an access to and 
a representational format for those elastic constraints which 
underlay [sic] and condition any word-type’s meaning, the 
interpretations i t  allows within possible contexts of use, and 
the information its actual word-token employment on a par- 
ticular occasion may convey. 
We conclude this analysis of the semantic concept of information by 
stating that even if information is seen as something existing indepen- 
dently of a receiver’s knowledge, this does not necessarily imply that 
information is something absolute. The situation theory conceives infor- 
mation in relation to situations with their constraints and contingencies. 
Oeser (1976) remarks that the objectivity of scientific knowledge is not 
attained through the elimination of the knower, but on the basis of the 
intersubjective information process. Information is a “system-relative con- 
cept” (Oeser, 1976,II, p. 86). Some classical theories of information define 
it with regard to the change in the receiver’s model of reality; that is, as a 
pragmatic concept (MacKay, 1969; Morris, 1955). This is particularly the 
case with definitions based on system theory, second-order cybernetics, 
and semiotics (Qvortrup, 1993). Kornwachs (1996) defines pragmatic 
information as an  impinging entity, one that is able to change the struc- 
ture and the behavior of systems. According to biologists like Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela (1980), as well as cyberneticians like 
Heinz von Foerster (1980, 1984), information is the observer’s construc- 
tion of a mental difference that makes andor finds a difference in the 
external world. For Fluckiger (1999), information is an  individual’s brain 
construct. According to Qvortrup (1993, p. 12), the conception of informa- 
tion as a mental difference “doesn’t necessarily imply that the difference 
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in reality that triggered the mental difference called information is a 
mental construction.” The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann has devel- 
oped an information concept based on the theory of self-referential sys- 
tems. Luhmann (1987) distinguishes between biological and social (and 
psychic) systems. Social (and psychic) systems are constituted by mean- 
ing (Sinn). In the case of biological systems, self-reference means self- 
reproduction. Meaning is produced through processing differences, and 
this is possible because there is a meaning offer (Mitteilung) out of which 
a selection can be made. Information (Information) is, then, an event 
that produces a connection between differences or-Luhmann cites 
Bateson’s (1972, p. 459) famous definition-“a difference that makes a 
difference.” “Understanding” (Verstehen) is the difference between 
“meaning offer” (Mitteilung) and “selection” (Information). Communica- 
tion is the unity of meaning offer, information, and understanding. 
According to this theory, no transmission of information occurs between 
a sender and a receiver. This thing-oriented metaphor implies that there 
is something the sender has and loses when she or he sends it. The 
sender, in fact, makes a suggestion for selection. Information is not 
something identical for both sender and receiver, but it has to be consti- 
tuted through the communication process (Luhmann 1987, pp. 
193-194). Janich (1998) develops a theory of information that is exclu- 
sively related to purpose-oriented human actions. Information is defined 
as a predicate that qualifies standard request dialogues where linguis- 
tic utterances are speaker-, listener-, and form-invariant. Such invari- 
ances make it possible to reproduce these situations on the basis of 
anthropomorphic artificial devices. 
Information is a key concept in sociology, political science, and the eco- 
nomics of the so-called information society. According to Webster (1995, 
19961, definitions of information society can be analyzed with regard to 
five criteria: technological, economic, occupational, spatial, and cultural 
(Webster, 1995, p. 6). The technological definition is concerned with appli- 
cations of information technologies in society. The economic definition 
goes back to the pioneering work of Machlup (1962), Boulding (1966), 
Arrow (1979), and Porat (1977). The occupational definition is at  the 
heart of Porat’s (1977) and Bell’s (1973) theories. The spatial definition 
concerns information networks and the emergence of a “network market- 
place” (Castells, 1989). The cultural definition is related to the influence 
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of media in society. Classic theoreticians of the information society are, 
according to Webster: Bell, Giddens, Schiller, Habermas, Baudrillard, 
Vattimo, Poster, Lyotard, and Castells. 
According to Bougnoux (1993, 1995) the concepts of information and 
communication are inversely related: Communication is concerned with 
forecasting and redundancy; information with the new and the unfore- 
seen. There is no pure information or “information-in-itself‘ (that is, 
information is always related to some kind of redundancy or “noise”). To 
inform (others or oneself) means to select and to evaluate. This concept 
is particularly relevant in the field of journalism and mass media, but 
also, of course, in information science. The action of bringing a message 
and the message itself were designated in Greek by the terms angellein 
and angelia (Capurro, 1978). The modern concept of information as 
knowledge communication is not related just to a secular view of mes- 
sages and messengers but includes also a modern view of empirical 
knowledge shared by a (scientific) community. Postmodernity opens this 
concept to all kinds of messages, particularly within the perspective of a 
digital environment. We may call a science of knowledge (better: mes- 
sage) communication information science or angeletics (Capurro, 2000). 
Flusser (1996) has developed a “communicology” in which “discursive 
media” are concerned with the distribution of information whereas “dia- 
logical media” deal with the creation of new information. Flusser fears 
that mass media may swallow up dialogical media into a hierarchical 
model. He did not foresee the Internet as a communication structure in 
which both media would merge beyond a central or panoptic power. It is, 
of course, an open question how far this is, or will be, the case. 
Knppendorff (1994) has explored different information and communica- 
tion metaphors such as message transmission, the container metaphor, 
the metaphor of sharing common views, the argument metaphor, the 
canal metaphor, and the control metaphor. These metaphors originate 
within different cultural environments. The phenomena they address 
are intimately related to the metaphors themselves. We must learn to 
use them creatively; that is, to see their limits and to learn how to apply 
them accurately in different theoretical and practical situations. 
Braman (1989) provides an important discussion of approaches to defin- 
ing information for policy makers. Four major views are identified: (1) 
information as a resource, (2) information as a commodity, (3) information 
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as a perception of patterns, and (4) information as a constitutive force in 
society. The relative benefits and problems with each of these four concep- 
tions are discussed. Her article points out that the selection of one defini- 
tion over another has important consequences, and also that the tendency 
to neglect this problem results in conflicts rather than cooperation. 
Defining information is thus also a political decision. 
The information age is also called “the age of access” (Rifkin, 2000). 
Information production, distribution, and access are at the heart of the 
new economy. The terminological shift from information society to 
knowledge society signals that content, and not information technology, 
is the main challenge for the economy as well as for society in general. 
From the perspective of knowledge management, information is used to 
designate isolated pieces of meaningful data that, when integrated 
within a context, constitute knowledge (Gundry 2001; Probst, Raub, & 
Romhard, 1999). This semantic concept of information, located between 
data and knowledge, is not consistent with the view that equates infor- 
mation (management) with information technology. According to 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995)-who follow Polanyi’s (1966) distinction 
between tacit and explicit knowledge-only explicit knowledge (infor- 
mation) can be managed. Correctly speaking, knowledge cannot be man- 
aged, only enabled (von Krogh, Ichijo, & Nonaka, 2000). For Cornella 
(2000), companies are information. Castells (1996-1998) gives a com- 
prehensive and critical analysis of the information age, including its 
social, economic, and cultural dimensions. For Hobart and Schiffman 
(2000), information is not a phenomenon that appears with modern tech- 
nology but rather the product of complex interactions between technol- 
ogy and culture. They distinguish among classical, modern, and 
contemporary information ages, the meaning of information being spe- 
cific to each age. 
The fundamental fact of information’s historicity liberates us 
from the conceit that ours is the information age, a conceit 
that underlies Kauffmanesque inferences from “computer- 
simulation movies” to history. It allows us to stand outside 
our contemporary information idiom, to see where it comes 
from, what it does, and how it shapes our thought. (Hobart & 
Schiffman, 2000, p. 264) 
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Brown and Duguid (2000) question “the myth of information” and 
information technologies that would be able to shape social organization 
by themselves. For it is not shared information but shared interpreta- 
tion that binds people together. Borgmann’s (1999, p. 57) critical 
appraisal of the nature of information is a plea for a new cultural and 
ethical balance between what he calls technological, natural, and cul- 
tural information: “Natural information pivots on natural signs-clouds, 
smoke, tracks. Cultural information centers on conventional signs-let- 
ters and texts, lines and graphs, notes and scores.” 
Borgmann (1999, pp. 218-219) sees technological information as the 
product of developments that began a century ago: 
Based on information technology, our omniscience and 
omnipotence have achieved such transparency and control of 
information that there are not things any more to be discov- 
ered beyond the signs. Nothing is any longer buried beneath 
information. Behind the virtual self-representations there 
are no real persons left to be acknowledged. 
We close this by no means exhaustive analysis of the con- 
cept of information in the humanities and social sciences with 
Eliot’s (1969, p. 147) famous quotation: 
Where is the Life we have lost in living? 
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? 
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information? 
We started this presentation of interdisciplinary theories 
by asking whether a common core can be found in the concept 
of information. According to Karpatschof (2000, pp. 131-132): 
Information 
The quality of a certain signal in relation to 
a certain release mechanism, the signal being 
a low-energy phenomenon fulfilling some 
release specifications. 
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The signal is thus the indirect cause, and the 
process of the release mechanism the direct cause 
of the resulting high-energy reaction. 
The release mechanism itself is, of course, an emergent 
entity, when it is seen from a cosmological position. This 
is the precise agenda, for biogony and biogenesis to fur- 
nish theories with an analysis of this emergence. We 
can thus more precisely define: 
Release Mechanisms 
Systems having at their disposal a store of poten- 
tial energy, the system being “designed” to let this 
energy out in a specific way, whenever trigged by 
a signal fulfilling the specifications of the release 
mechanism 
It is now clear why there has been this tendency to con- 
sider information to be an obscure category that is in 
addition to the classical categories of physics. 
Information is indeed a new category, but it cannot be 
placed, eclectically, beside the prior physical categories. 
Information is a category, not beside, but indeed above 
the classical categories of physics. Therefore, information 
is neither directly reducible to these classical categories, 
nor is it a radically different category of another nature 
than mass and energy. Information is, in fact, the causal 
result of existing physical components and processes. 
Moreover, it is an emergent result of such physical enti- 
ties. This is revealed in the systemic definition of infor- 
mation. It is a relational concept that includes the source, 
the signal, the release mechanism and the reaction as its 
relatants. One might ask where I place the category of 
information in my system of ontology. 
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Should it be placed in the object field of cosmology, just 
as mass, energy and causality? Or, should it be placed 
in the object field of biology? My answer to this question 
will be the latter position. (all emphasis in original) 
In our opinion, Karpatschof‘s explanation identifies a key perspective 
of the concept of information that most interdisciplinary discussions can 
agree upon. It seems to  be a reductionistic and indeed mechanical per- 
spective, antithetical to a humanistic understanding. However, this is 
not the case. Karpatschof does not explain psychological or sociological 
phenomena by physical or biological principles. He does not consider 
information as a thing or as something objective. He forces us to look at 
the many different kinds of mechanisms at  different levels in evolution 
and culture that have evolved to discriminate certain kinds of signals. In 
other words, he forces us to shift the perspective from information as an 
object to the subjective mechanisms that account for discrimination, 
interpretation, or selection. What distinguishes different theories of 
information is, thus, not so much the concept of information itself. It is, 
to a much higher degree, the nature of the “release mechanism” (or “infor- 
mation processing mechanisms”), the selectors or interpreters. To ask 
about the nature of this mechanism means, for instance, to ask about the 
nature of living organisms, the nature of human beings, human lan- 
guage, society, and technology. Because there are many kinds of release 
mechanisms developed in biology, in the human mind, in cultures, and in 
technologies, different sciences tend to work with different concepts and 
theoretical frames of reference. Information can and should thus be stud- 
ied within a network of different disciplines, not just by “information sci- 
ence” (Capurro, 2001). No wonder, then, that the mechanisms of 
information-and information itself-have been so difficult to tackle. 
Information in information Science 
Relationship with Librarianship and 
Scientific Documentation 
As we have seen, the word information has a much richer history than 
the fields of inquiry known as library science, documentation, and infor- 
mation science, which are largely products of the 20th century. Tracing the 
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influence of this term and the very complex net of disciplines connected 
with it is indeed difficult. Machlup and Mansfield (1983, p. 22) suggested 
that “in the broad sense information science is a rather shapeless assem- 
blage of chunks picked from a variety of disciplines that happen to talk 
about information in one of its many meanings.” In this chapter only a few 
important points will be illuminated. 
Some key events can be taken as signposts for our orientation in this 
complex area. 
Information desk appeared as an alternate to reference desk 
by 1891. Information bureau was in use by 1909 to denote an 
office where reference service was provided; in 1924 the 
Association of Special Libraries and Information Bureaux 
(Aslib) was founded in Britain. In the Aslib Proceedings for 
1932, information work was introduced to describe reference 
assistance. Use of information as an equivalent of reference 
began to give way, under the influence of developments in com- 
puting, to more sophisticated usage. (Shapiro, 1995, p. 384) 
The term information was also used in 1915 by the American special 
librarian, Ethel Johnson, who noted, “before everything else, it [the spe- 
cial library] is an information bureau. The main function of the general 
library is to make books available. The function of the special library is 
to make information available” (quoted by Williams, 1998, p. 174). 
According to Williams (19981, special librarians were the first docu- 
mentalists in the U.S.; and, according to Rayward (1998), documental- 
ists can be seen as the first information scientists. We are thus able to 
trace one line of development from special librarianship via documenta- 
tion to information science in both the U.K. and the US.  The line of 
development from Paul Otlet (1934) and Suzanne Briet (1951) is dis- 
cussed by Day (2001) in critical fashion. 
In 1968, the American Documentation Institute (founded in 1937) 
changed its name to the American Society for Information Science. From 
that time, “information” gradually replaced “documentation” as a name 
for a profession and field of study (at least until a recent tendency to re- 
introduce the concept of documents by Buckland, 1997; Hjarland, 2000; 
Lund, 1997; White & McCain, 1998; and others). Only a few institutions 
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have preserved the term documentation (e.g., Journal of Documentation; 
FBderation Internationale de Documentation). One notable exception is 
in Tromsa, Norway, where “Documentation Science” has recently been 
chosen as the name for a newly founded institute. It is far more common 
to do as the Royal School of Library and Information Science in 
Copenhagen did in 1997: namely, add information. to its name (although 
only to the English version). The important question is, of course, what 
kinds of theoretical influences lie behind such choices? How is the term 
information theoretically related to what is studied (if at all)? 
According to Hj~rland (2000) the increasing trend toward using the 
term information in institutions of librarianship and documentation is 
mainly related to: (1) an increasing interest in computer applications (or 
“information technology”), and (2) an indirect, theoretical influence from 
information theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1972) and the paradigm of 
information processing in the cognitive sciences. 
The same paper also argues that this tendency has serious draw- 
backs. Theories that are appropriate for computer science are not neces- 
sarily adequate for library science, documentation, and scientific 
communication. A serious risk arises such that concepts and theories 
related to information theory tend to reduce the study of documentary 
communication to computer science and cognitive science, thus remov- 
ing the basis of the field in its own right. 
Library science as taught in schools of librarianship has always had 
public libraries as a major focus simply because public libraries have con- 
stituted an important market for professionally trained librarians. This 
situation has influenced both the focus of the field and its underlying 
assumptions, preferences, and “paradigms” (for example, the predilection 
for universal classifications systems and the relative neglect of domain- 
specific knowledge). Special librarianship and documentation (and later 
information science), on the other hand, were much more concerned with 
research libraries, databases, and with activities connected to the seek- 
ing and dissemination of scientific literature-and also the application of 
information technologies. Documentatiodinformation science was origi- 
nally based more on specific subject knowledge (chemistry has played an 
especially important role in information science), whereas special librar- 
ianship relied more on education and training in schools of librarianship. 
According to  Williams (1998, p. 177) special librarians in the U S .  lost 
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ground to documentalists and information scientists because they lacked 
the specific subject knowledge to handle complex information (for exam- 
ple, in chemical indexing and retrieval). 
These changes, particularly when confronted with the insistence 
of the documentalists that a new profession Werent  from 
librarianship, even special librarianship, needed to be devel- 
oped, had the effect of making them [the special librarians] more 
general library oriented and less special library oriented. The 
overall effect on special librarianship and SLA [Special Libraries 
Association] is a decline in their domination of new develop- 
ments in information management. As will be shown in the next 
section, one of the major reasons special librarians had lost this 
dominance was because they emphasized general education in 
librarianship to the neglect of the scientific fields they had to 
serve. They were now librarians first and foremost, and only 
knowledgeable about their subject areas second, if at all. 
However, since about 1975, information science has been foregrounded in 
schools of library science. Ths may be due in part to an increasing interest 
in being associated with such important fields as computer-based informa- 
tion retrieval and other areas of information science. Although schools of 
library science are major contributors in the field, as reflected in their con- 
tributions to the leading journals in IS; they have also faced challenges, par- 
ticularly in the U.S. This situation may be connected to what they teach, 
including the old problem concerning the lack of specific subject knowledge. 
It may be, however, that the neglect of subject knowledge reflects a privi- 
leging of research into users rather than information, and, by implication, a 
tendency toward psychologism, subjective idealism, and methodological 
individ~alism.~ The terms information and IS became institutionalized in, 
among other places, schools of library science, which in the process o h n  
changed their names and their curricula. The question is how well we have 
succeeded in developing information science as a healthy field of inquiry. 
Information Retrieval and the Concept of 
Information 
The term information retrieval (IR) is possibly one of the most impor- 
tant  terms in the field known as information science. Acritical question 
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is, thus, why, and in what sense, IR uses the term information. IR can 
be seen both as a field of study and as one among several research tra- 
ditions concerned with information storage and r e t r i e ~ a l . ~  Although the 
field is much older, the tradition goes back to the early 1960s and the 
Cranfield experiments, which introduced measures of recall and preci- 
sion. Those experiments rank among the most famous in IS and con- 
tinue today in the TREC experiments (Text REtrieval Conference). This 
tradition has always been closely connected to documentftext retrieval, 
as stated by van Rijsbergen (1979, p. 1): 
Information retrieval is a wide, often loosely-defined term, 
but in these pages I shall be concerned only with automatic 
information retrieval systems. Automatic as opposed to man- 
ual and information as opposed to data or fact. Unfortunately 
the word information can be very misleading. In the context of 
information retrieval (IR), information, in the technical mean- 
ing given in Shannon’s theory of communication, is not read- 
ily measured (Shannon and Weaver). In fact, in many cases 
one can adequately describe the kind of retrieval by simply 
substituting “document” for “information.” Nevertheless, 
“information retrieval” has become accepted as a description 
of the kind of work published by Cleverdon, Salton, Sparck 
Jones, Lancaster and others. A perfectly straightforward defi- 
nition along these lines is given by Lancaster: “Information 
retrieval is the term conventionally, though somewhat inaccu- 
rately, applied to the type of activity discussed in this volume. 
An information retrieval system does not inform (i.e. change 
the knowledge of) the user on the subject of his inquiry. It 
merely informs on the existence (or non-existence) and where- 
abouts of documents relating to his request.” This specifically 
excludes Question-Answering systems as typified by Wino- 
grad and those described by Minsky. It also excludes data 
retrieval systems such as used by, say, the stock exchange for 
on-line quotations. [Notes to references omitted]. 
In 1996, van Rijsbergen and Lalmas (p. 386), however, declared that 
the situation had changed and that the purpose of an information 
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retrieval system was to provide information about a request. Although 
some researchers have fantasized about eliminating the concept of docu- 
menutext and simply storing or retrieving the facts or “information” con- 
tained therein, it is our opinion that IR usually means document retrieval 
and not fact retrieval.6 We shall return to the difference between docu- 
ments and facts later, but here we want to show why information (and 
not, for example, document, text, or literature) was chosen as a central 
term in this core area. 
Ellis (1996, pp. 187-188) describes “an anomaly” in IS: 
Brookes noted the anomaly could be resolved if information 
retrieval theory were named document retrieval theory 
which would then be part of library science. However, he com- 
mented that those working in the field of information 
retrieval were making the explicit claim to be working with 
information not documentation. 
What Brookes (1981, p. 2) stated was, 
From an information science point of view, research on IR sys- 
tems offers only a theoretical cul-de-sac. It leads nowhere. The 
anomaly I have noted is this: the information-handling 
processes of the computers used for IR systems, their storage 
capacities, their input, and internal information transmis- 
sions, are measured in terms of Shannon theory measures- 
in bits, megabits per second, and so forth. On the other hand, 
in the theories of information retrieval effectiveness, informa- 
tion is measured in what I callphysical measures-that is, the 
documents (or document surrogates) are counted as relevant 
or non-relevant and simple ratios of these numbers are used. 
The subsequent probabilistic calculations are made as though 
the documents were physical things (as, of course, they are in 
part), yet the whole enterprise is called information retrieval 
theory. So why, I ask, are logarithmic measures of information 
used in the theory of the machine and linear or physical mea- 
sures of information in IR theory? 
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If information retrieval theory were called document 
retrieval theory, the anomaly would disappear. And docu- 
ment retrieval theory would fall into place as a component of 
library science, which is similarly concerned with docu- 
ments. But that is too simple an idea. Those who work on IR 
theory explicitly claim to be working on information, not doc- 
umentation. I therefore abandon the simple explanation of a 
misuse of terminology. I have to assume that IR theorists 
mean what they say-that they are contributing to informa- 
tion science. But are they? [emphasis in original1 
Ellis and Brookes should not refer to the opinions of researchers in 
their attempts to solve this problem. Only arguments count. In our view, 
it is not too simple an idea to claim that information retrieval theory is 
in reality document retrieval theory and thus closely associated with 
library science. It is not difficult to disprove Brookes’s statement that 
information retrieval does not deal with documents. A short examination 
of the literature demonstrates this, and even if the Cranfield experi- 
ments spoke about “information retrieval,” their modern counterpart, 
the TREC experiments, speak about “text retrieval.” “Text retrieval” and 
“document retrieval” are often used as synonyms for IR. 
If one reads Brookes’s statement in the light of the relationship 
between the early documentalists and information scientists, it becomes 
clear that information scientists wanted to forge a distinct identity to be 
both more information techfiology-oriented and more subject-knowledge 
oriented. One reason for information scientists to prefer not to be linked 
to library science might be that important technological improvements 
were carried out not by people associated with librarianship, but by 
those affiliated with computer science. This preference is most probably 
the reason they claimed to work with “information, not documentation.” 
Nevertheless Brookes’s statement is flawed, and it has provoked endless 
speculation about the nature of information, which has not contributed 
to an understanding of the problems of IR. (Compare the quotation by 
Schrader, 1983, p. 99, cited earlier.) 
The worst thing may be that information scientists have overlooked 
some of the most important theoretical problems in the field. Van 
Rijsbergen (1986, p. 194) has pointed out that the concept of meaning 
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has been overlooked in IS. The fundamental basis of all previous work- 
including his own-is in his opinion wrong because it has been based on 
the assumption that a formal notion of meaning is not required to solve IR 
problems. For us it is reasonable to suggest a link between the neglect of 
the concepts of text and documents on one hand and meaning (or seman- 
tics) on the other. Semantics, meaning, text, and documents are much 
more related to theories about language and literature, whereas informa- 
tion is much more related to theories about computation and control. We 
do not claim, however, that the statistical methods used in IR have not 
been efficient. We do claim, however, that semantics and pragmatics, 
among other things, are essential to better theoretical development in IR, 
and in the long run also to the improvement of operational systems. 
Information and Assemblages of Facts 
In spite of our claim that IR is actually document retrieval, there has 
been throughout the history of the field a problematic tendency to regard 
information as assemblages of facts or opinions freed from the documents. 
In the literature of IS a distinction is made between document retrieval 
and fact retrieval. As a response to a query, a document retrieval system 
provides a list of references about the subject, which with a certain prob- 
ability is supposed to  contain the answer to the query, or rather to reveal 
the present documented knowledge about the problem. Fact retrieval sys- 
tems, on the other hand, are supposed to provide concrete answers to 
queries. If the query is: ‘What is the definition of information science?” a 
document retrieval system such as Library and Information Science 
Abstracts (LISA) produces a long list of papers discussing this issue, 
whereas a fact retrieval system provides you with one selected definition. 
Some distinguished IS researchers have regarded the creation of 
fact retrieval systems as the ultimate goal of information science. 
Karen Sparck Jones (1987, p. 91, for instance, claims that “we are con- 
cerned with access and, more materially, indirect access to  the infor- 
mation the user wants: he wants the information in the documents, but 
the system only gives him the documents.” This statement represents 
a rather narrow view with roots back to the foundation of documenta- 
tion and information science: 
Some of Paul Otlet’s basic ideas are described by Rayward (1994, p. 
247) as “the outmoded paradigm of nineteenth-century positivism:” 
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Otlet’s concern was for the objective knowledge that was both 
contained in and hidden by documents. His view of knowledge 
was authoritarian, reductionist, positivist, simplistic-and 
optimistic! . . . It is merely a question of institutionalizing cer- 
tain processes for analyzing and organizing the content of 
documents. For him that aspect of the content of documents 
with which we must be concerned is facts. He speaks almost 
everywhere of facts. 
Rayward (1994, pp. 247-248) finds the same view represented in 
modern IS: 
In  describing the Xanadu Project, Nelson (1987) for example, 
in capital letters, says that it is “just one thing: a new form of 
interconnection for computer files-CORRESPONDING TO 
THE TRUE INTERCONNECTION OF IDEAS which can be 
refined and elaborated into a shared network” (p. 143). These 
words and the sentiments that  they both express and seem to 
imply could be, except for the term “computer files,” Otlet’s 
own. They suggest an atavistic positivist perspective that 
takes one by surprise. 
In practice, document retrieval systems coexist with systems that 
provide concrete answers. Directories, dictionaries, handbooks of chem- 
ical and physical constants, and many other kinds of reference works are 
examples of factographic works and databases that  have important 
functions and exist side-by-side with bibliographic databases. However, 
we find it important to argue against the view that bibliographical data- 
bases or full-text databases should be less than ideal because “[the user] 
wants the information in the documents, but the system only gives him 
the documents” (Sparck Jones, 1987, p. 9). 
The idea that bibliographic information systems should be reduced to 
fact retrieval systems is a problematic assumption. We agree with 
Rayward that this view is related to a kind of obsolete positivism. We also 
see this view as  one reason for the use of the terms information and infor- 
mation science. Because it is often desirable to know the source (e.g., in 
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order to compare it with other sources or to evaluate its cognitive author- 
ity), document retrieval should not be reduced to fact retrieval systems. 
We let Spang-Hanssen (1970/2001, online) have the final word on this 
issue: 
Moreover, these terms are not seldom confused with a more 
or less obscure use of the word information to mean some- 
thing factual or real as opposed to representations of such 
facts; what is found written in documents-or what is said in 
a lecture-are according to this view only disguises or at best 
surrogates of facts. This more or less vague conception seems 
to be the basis of the distinction sometimes made between 
“fact retrieval” and “document retrieval.” 
This distinction I find philosophically unbased; we here 
touch upon the fundamental problem of the meaning of 
meaning and of the nature of signs and symbols. What is 
more essential to us, this distinction seems unhappy in actual 
documentation work. There will, admittedly, be cases in 
which a document or information center is set up with the 
exclusive function of providing information concerning phys- 
ical data, or statistical figures, or exchange rates of curren- 
cies, or stock market prices. But even in such cases it applies 
that neither the person who requests such information nor 
the person to deliver it should ignore the reliability of data 
and forget about the general setting in which the data are 
acquired. An information about some physical property of a 
material is actually incomplete without information about 
the precision of some figure and about the conditions under 
which this figure was obtained. Moreover, various investiga- 
tions of a property have often led to different results that can- 
not be compared and evaluated apart from information about 
their background. An empirical fact always has a history and 
a perhaps not too certain future. This history and future can 
be known only by information from particular documents, i.e. 
by document retrieval. 
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The so-called fact retrieval centers seem to me to be just 
information centers that keep their information sources-i.e. 
their documents-exclusively to themselves. 
Romm (1997) shows that serious ethical implications are involved in 
defining something as factual as opposed to meaningful. To the extent 
that information is seen or presented and legitimized in terms of its sup- 
posed factual content, it authorizes a picture of the world-rather than 
inviting debate on the construction and relevance of the picture. 
Conversely, insofar as information is treated as a product of specific 
world-constructing activities, it invites discursive inquiry as to its mean- 
ing and relevance. 
lnforrnation and the Scientific Division of Labor 
Are information scientists the only professionals who are working with 
the “generation, collection, organization, interpretation, storage, 
retrieval, dissemination, transformation, and use of information”? (This 
quote is part of the official definition of information science given by the 
American Society €or Information Science and Technology [Borko, 1968; 
Griffith, 19801 quoted in full later in this chapter.) We often assume this 
to be the case. If this is not the case, it seems important to try to specify 
the special role of information scientists in handling information. 
In one sense of the word information, astronomers can be seen as 
experts who identify, process, and interpret information from the uni- 
verse. The byproducts of their activities they keep as observations in one 
form or another. They may make photographs of parts of the universe and 
of single stars, planets, and galaxies. They also publish their empirical 
and theoretical findings in journals and other publications. Both the pho- 
tographs and the publications are examples of documents. The library, 
documentation, and information profession is interested in all kind of doc- 
uments. Its core interest and expertise is, however, related to the com- 
munication of published documents. Our point is that in the sense of the 
word information as it is used about astronomers’ activities, infomation 
scientists are not experts in interpreting the information from the stars, 
but at most are experts in handling information documented by 
astronomers (e.g., indexing and retrieving astronomical documents). In 
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this example, information is defined in a broader sense than is usually 
implied in information science. 
Just as astronomers can be said to handle information professionally, 
so it is with other groups. Publishers, researchers, historians, lawyers, 
and teachers can be said to be professional information handlers in some 
fashion. Defining information in a way other than implied here can solve 
this problem. Belkin (1978, p. 60) explicitly seeks to solve this problem 
by demanding that, “in general, any information concept for information 
science must refer to at least the specific domain of information science, 
as indicated by its problem. This means purposeful, meaningful, human 
communication, with the specific requirements as noted above.” 
But this solution has some disadvantages. In information science we 
are sometimes interested in studying the researcher’s selection of an 
information channel, including whether he or she prefers to go the 
library or to make an observation for himself or herself. 
This distinction was made in Taylor’s (1968) study of question nego- 
tiation and information seeking in libraries. If we define information in 
the narrow sense, as something belonging solely to information science 
(as proposed by Belkin), we are not able to make comparative studies of 
this sort. Because we find Taylor’s questions relevant and consider that 
he uses the concept of information in a fruitful way, we see a dilemma in 
using Belkin’s (1978) definition in information ~cience.~ 
The role of information specialists may be relatively clear when the 
target group is, for example, astronomers: information specialists are 
experts on forms of publications, databases, reference tools, and so forth. 
In the case of, for example, historians or lawyers, the borders are much 
less clear because the information that these professions are seeking, 
interpreting, and using is itself contained in publications and docu- 
ments. The historian, not the librarian or information specialist, is the 
expert in seeking, organizing, interpreting, and utilizing the documents 
needed in his or her professional work. Still, an information specialist 
has more professional expertise regarding specific matters such as data- 
bases and cataloging. 
One of the most frequently used definitions of information science is 
as follows: 
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Information science is concerned with the generation, collec- 
tion, organization, interpretation, storage, retrieval, dissemi- 
nation, transformation, and use of information, with 
particular emphasis on the applications of modern technolo- 
gies in these areas. 
As a discipline, it seeks to create and structure a body of 
scientific, technological, and systems knowledge related to the 
transfer of information. It has both pure science (theoretical) 
components, which inquire into the subject without regard to 
application, and applied science (practical) components, which 
develop services and products. (GrifEth, 1980, p. 518 
In our view, this definition does not contain a good identification of 
the special focus of information science. No science should be defined by 
its tools (e.g., modern technologies). All fields are supposed to utilize the 
most appropriate tools available. A science should be defined by its 
object of study. As such, the study of information is a better one. We 
need, however, to identify the specific role of information science in rela- 
tion to “the generation, collection, organization, interpretation, storage, 
retrieval, dissemination, transformation and use of information” as dis- 
tinct from the activities in which other professionals are more qualified. 
In our view, information professionals usually have a broad overview of 
information sources, sociological patterns in knowledge production, doc- 
ument types, and so on. They should also have a broader knowledge of 
the philosophy of science (e.g., paradigms and epistemology), and of the 
principles of language use for special purposes. We believe that the focus 
of information professionals (as distinct from the professional groups 
they are serving) implies a sociological and epistemological approach to 
“the generation, collection, organization, interpretation, storage, 
retrieval, dissemination, transformation and use of in f~rmat ion .”~  
Information scientists-by the very nature of their field-must work in 
a top-down mode, from the general field of knowledge and information 
sources to the specific, whereas domain experts must work in a bottom- 
up mode, from the specific to the general. 
With regard to the concept of information, the implication is that what 
counts as  information-what is informative-depends on the question to 
be answered. The same representation of an  object (e.g., a stone in a field) 
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contains different information for, say, an archaeologist or a geologist. The 
same matter should therefore be represented differently in different sub- 
ject databases. The concept of information itself can be defined universal- 
istically (e.g., Bateson, 1972). Information is anything that is of 
importance in answering a question. Anything can be information. In 
practice, however, information must be defined in relation to the needs of 
the target groups served by information specialists, not in a universalistic 
or individualistic, but rather in a collectivist or particularistic fashion. 
Information is what can answer important questions related to the activ- 
ities of the target group. The generation, collection, organization, inter- 
pretation, storage, retrieval, dissemination, and transformation of 
information must therefore be based on viewsltheories about the prob- 
lems, questions, and goals that the information is going to satisfy. In pub- 
lic libraries, those goals are related to the democratic role of the public 
library in society. In medicine, they are related to the solving of health 
problems. In women’s studies, they are related to the understanding and 
emancipation of women. In commercial systems, they are linked to busi- 
ness strategy. 
Diverse Views and Theories of Information in IS 
Information Theory 
Outside documentation and library science, in 1948, important devel- 
opments occurred in so-called information theory, in cybernetics, and in 
technological theories as well as in communication (Shannon & Weaver, 
1972; Wiener, 1961). These fields built the foundations for subsequent 
developments in computer science (or information technology).1° It is 
widely recognized that information theory is a problematic term, and 
that even the term information technology may be a misleading label for 
data technology or computer technology. A consequence of Shannon’s 
theory was that the word information became extremely influential in 
all areas of society, and fashionable in English and other languages. 
Shannon’s information theory has had an impact on many fields, 
including library and information science and documentation. The his- 
tory of this impact or reception has yet to be written. There is no doubt, 
however, that in the 1950s many people found that this theory could be 
used as a strong conceptual model for research in numerous fields, 
The Concept of information 391 
including psychology, the social sciences, and documentation. Problems 
with this approach soon appeared (Rapoport, 19531, and the initial opti- 
mism disappeared, leaving many fields without an adequate theoretical 
frame. From an information-theoretical point of view, information can be 
precisely defined and measured. For example, in February 1999, 
Lawrence and Giles (1999) found about 15 terabytes of information on 
the Internet. This is not, however, the same concept of information as 
that used by information specialists when seeking, selecting, or indexing 
information sources. These activities relate to the content and meaning 
of messages, not just to their physical storage and transmission. 
Wersig (1996, p. 221) concluded his presentation of information the- 
ory with the following remark: 
This was not so in human contexts, where neither the 
assumption of coherent sets of signs nor the assumption of 
the identity of original message, signs, and reconstructed 
message were applicable. The very notion of semiotics, which 
in fact became one of the most important critiques of too sim- 
ple an application of information theory to human communi- 
cation, led to the insight that Shannon’s mathematical 
theory was only a theory on the syntactical level (relation of 
signs to  signs), but with no reference to the semantic (rela- 
tions of signs to meanings) and pragmatic (relation of signs 
to humans) levels. In consequence, some attempts were 
made to develop out of Shannon’s theory a semantic (e.g., 
Bar-Hillel & Carnap, 1953) or pragmatic (e.g., Yovits, 1975) 
information theory. But they remained in the literature with 
no great success. 
In spite of the overall tendency to regard Shannon’s information the- 
ory as a blind alley in information science, studies are still published 
from this perspective (e.g., Wong & Yao, 1992; Zachary, Iyengar, & 
Barhen, 2001). 
Dretske’s theory originates from philosophy and was outlined earlier. 
It has been cited 15 times in the literature of library and information sci- 
ence.ll Patrick Wilson (1983, p. 62) has provided a short but useful review 
of Dretske (1981). He concludes: 
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How relevant is all of this to information science? I suspect that 
most information scientists are not much concerned with infor- 
mation in Dretske’s sense of the word; they are concerned with 
meaning, not information. The documents whose storage and 
retrieval interests them may or may not carry any information, 
but they do have semantic content or meaning, which is the 
main thing. If that is so, and if Dretske’s notion of information 
is the “right” one, then information science is perhaps mis- 
named. Dretske’s idea of information is clearly closer to the 
“ordinary” idea of information than is the usual information sci- 
entist’s idea of information; in the ordinary sense, information 
is contrasted with misinformation, but not so for the informa- 
tion scientist. It would, I think, be beneficial if some informa- 
tion scientists would take the trouble to read this book, with 
this question in mind: is information science really concerned 
with information? And if it is not now, could it be in the future? 
Wilson’s proposal has been heeded. Van Rijsbergen and Lalmas (1996) 
are the most prominent followers of Dretske’s approach. Together with 
Barwise (1993) and Devlin (1991), van Rijsbergen and Lalmas (1996, p. 
385) call their approach DBD: Dretske, Barwise and Devlin. Van 
Rijsbergen withdraws his former conclusion that information retrieval is 
actually document retrieval and tries to develop a theory that bases IR 
on an  objective conception of information. The other references to 
Dretske’s theory in IS (e.g., Bonnevie, 2001; Losee, 1997; Mingers, 1995) 
seem rather unrelated to one another. 
The Cognitive View 
We have already discussed core definitions of information connected 
with the cognitive view in information science: Brookes’s (1977) pseudo- 
mathematical expression: K(S) + 61 -> K(S + 6s) and Belkin’s (1978, p. 
60) definition, which managed to define information as a phenomenon 
relatively specific to information science by viewing information as  a com- 
municated and transformed knowledge state in the form of a structure. 
Through the work of Brookes (19801, Karl Popper’s metaphysical plu- 
ralism has been connected to the cognitive view. As is well known, 
Popper’s ontology consists of three worlds: 
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World 1: physical objects or states, 
World 2: consciousness or psychical states, 
World 3. intellectual contents such as books, documents, 
scientific theories, etc. 
Popper uses the words “knowledge” and “information” interchangeably. 
In Popper (1974, p. 10511, World 3 explicitly encompasses information: 
In  my way of looking at World 3,  its theories contain essen- 
tially the information content which is conveyed by them. 
And two books which may differ widely as World 1 objects 
may be identical insofar as they are World 3 objects-say, if 
they contain the same coded information. 
Popper’s World 3 has been compared to the concept of signs in the 
(monist) semiotic tradition from Charles Peirce onward (see 
Skagestad, 1993): 
While Freeman and Skolimowski discuss both Peirce’s doc- 
trine of signs and Popper’s World 3 epistemology, they do not 
note that the entities comprising Popper’s World 3 are signs 
in the Peircean sense, or that Peirce’s doctrine of signs repre- 
sents a World 3 epistemology that in many respects is more 
detailed and developed than Popper’s; nor has this been 
noted by any other writer that we are aware of. Again, we do 
not mean simply that World 3 consists of objects which Peirce 
would have classified as signs-that would be a rather trivial 
observation, given the ambitious scope of Peirce’s doctrine of 
signs. Rather, as we have already seen, Popper’s own state- 
ment that a World 3 object, such as  a book, is constituted by 
its “dispositional character of being understood or inter- 
preted,” is what recapitulates Peirce’s definition of a sign as 
whatever is capable of being interpreted. 
The tendency within and beyond IS has been to favor Peirce’s semi- 
otic view over Popper’s metaphysical pluralism. I t  makes sense to con- 
sider informative objects as  signs (as World 1 phenomena) that for some 
subjects (or “release mechanisms,” which are also World 1 phenomena) 
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trigger some responses (interpretation, selection), and thus introduce 
teleological principles into the material world (World 1). According to  
Rudd (1983), we simply do not need Popper’s World 3 in order to explain 
informational processes. 
The most recent description of the cognitive view is presented by 
Borlund (2000, p. 161, who is a student of Peter Ingwersen. She finds 
that Ingwersen adds the concepts of potential information and data 
“and in a way the modified model becomes the trademark of Ingwersen, 
as he, in several cases, uses it to present an overview of IR interac- 
tions.” We see the cognitive view as taking a position between the objec- 
tive concept of information in both information theory and Dretske’s 
theory on one hand, and the subjective or interpretative view taken by 
information scientists inspired by hermeneutics, semiotics, domain 
analysis, and so forth, on the other hand. 
Information-as-Thing 
Buckland (1991a) analyzes various uses of the term information in 
information science. It can be used in relation to things, processes, and 
knowledge (see Table 8.1). 
Buckland’s analysis seems to have two important consequences: On 
one hand, it reintroduces the concept of document (“information-as- 
thing”), and on the other hand, it points out the subjective nature of 
Table 8.1 Four aspects of information (after Buckland, 1991a. p. 6). 
ENTITY 
PROCESS 
INTANGIBLE 
Information-as-knowledge 
Knowledge 
Information-as-process 
Becoming informed 
~ 
TANGIBLE 
Informauon-as-thng 
Data, document, recorded 
knowledge 
Information processing 
Data processing, document 
processing, knowledge engineenng 
[“Fluxed information” telephone 
calk, TV broadcast hours, etc ] 
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information. Astump of a tree contains information about its age as well 
as about the climate during the tree’s lifetime. In similar fashion, any- 
thing might in some imaginable circumstances be informative: “We con- 
clude that we are unable to sav confidently of anvthine that it could not 
be information” (Buckland, 1991a, p, 50., underlining in original). Just 
as anything couldmight be symbolic, Buckland maintains that any 
thing couldmight be informativelinformation. 
Domain Analysis, Socio-Cognitivism, Hermeneutics, 
Semiotics, and Related Views 
The cognitive view takes a step toward a subjective understanding of 
information. Buckland goes another step. The domain analytic view sees 
different objects as being informative relative to the social division of 
labor in society. In this way, information is a subjective concept, but not 
primarily in an individual sense. Criteria for what counts as information 
are formed by sociocultural and scientific processes. Users should be 
seen as individuals in concrete situations within social organizations 
and domains of knowledge. A stone in a field could contain different 
information for different people. It is not possible for information sys- 
tems to map all possible information values. Nor is any one mapping the 
only “true” situation. People have different educational backgrounds and 
play different roles in the division of labor in society. A stone in a field 
(or, of course, a document about a stone in a field such as a photograph) 
represents one kind of information for the geologist and another for the 
archaeologist. The information from the stone can be mapped onto the 
different collective knowledge structures produced by geology and 
archaeology. Information can be identified, described, and represented 
in information systems for different domains of knowledge. Of course, 
problems arise in determining whether a thing is informative or not for 
a domain. Some domains have a high degree of consensus and explicit 
relevance criteria. Other domains have different, conflicting paradigms, 
each containing its own more or less implicit view of the informativeness 
of different kinds of information sources. 
The domain-analytic view is related to a hermeneutic view because 
the understanding is determined by the pre-understanding of the 
observer. An explicit “information hermeneutics” has been developed by 
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Capurro (e.g., 1986). It is also related to semiotic approaches (e.g., Brier, 
1992, 1999) and to the approach known as social constructivism (e.g., 
Frohmann 1990, 1994; Savolainen, 2000). 
Conclusion 
We should be aware that library and information science is only one 
discipline among a network of disciplines and metadisciplines dealing 
with communication, technology, systems, and related processes. We 
should try to further clarify our identity and our specific goals, and to 
strengthen historical continuity in the field. We should not consider the 
concept of information in isolation, but see it in relation to other concepts 
such as, for example, documents and media. The concept of information 
may indeed have had a positive effect as a status booster for professions 
primarily working with documents. However, this positive effect has had 
the unfortunate consequence of raising the level of confusion in the disci- 
pline. It is worth noting that important books can be written in the field 
without using the concept of information (e.g., Lancaster, 1998). Thus, 
researchers should be explicit about how they define this and other the- 
oretical terms. It should either be used for the sake of theoretical clarifi- 
cation, or-as Fairthorne (1965) recommended-not at all. 
There are many concepts of information, and they are embedded in 
more or less explicit theoretical structures. In studying information it is 
easy to lose one’s orientation. Therefore, it is important to state the prag- 
matic question: “What difference does it make if we use one or another 
theory, or concept, of information?” This task is difficult because many 
approaches involve implicit or vague concepts, which must be clarified. 
(Such a clarification may provoke resistance because information is so 
often used as a status-enhancing term with little theoretical ambition.) 
We should also ask ourselves what more we need to know about the con- 
cept of information in order to contribute to the further development of 
information science. 
In our view, the most important distinction is that between informa- 
tion as an object or a thing (e.g., number of bits) and information as a 
subjective concept, information as a sign; that is, as depending on the 
interpretation of a cognitive agent. The interpretative view shifts atten- 
tion from the attributes of things to the “release mechanisms” for which 
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those attributes are of importance. This shift may cause frustration 
because it is inherently difficult and because it implies teleological princi- 
ples that are foreign to the positivist principles of science. It is relatively 
easy to count the number of words in a document or describe it in other 
ways; it is much more difficult to try to figure out for whom that document 
is of importance, and what the important questions are that the document 
can answer. Questions of interpretation are also difficult because we often 
confuse interpretation with an individualist approach. Meaning is, how- 
ever, determined in social and cultural contexts. 
Finally, we want to emphasize the need to explicate the foundations 
of knowledge claims. When we represent data in our information sys- 
tems, we do so in order to support certain human activities. We should 
not simply regard our representations as objective, because that implies 
that we never fully specify the theoretical, social, and historical assump- 
tions on which we act. All kinds of information systems have policies and 
more or less explicit goals. What we regard as information should also 
be a reflection of the social role of the information system. 
As information systems become more global and interconnected, 
implicit information is often lost. This situation challenges information 
science to be more receptive to the social and cultural impacts of inter- 
pretative processes and also the qualitative differences between differ- 
ent contexts and media. This change means including interpretative 
processes as a conditio sine qua non of information processes. As we 
have shown, this task is an essentially multidisciplinary and interdisci- 
plinary one. Building networks is basically an interpretation process. 
Building a scientific network as a self-reflective activity presupposes the 
clarification of common concepts. One such concept is information. 
Appendix 
The Oxford English Dictionary (1989). Lists the following meanings 
for “information” [references omitted]: 
Information. Forms: a. 4-6 enformacion, (-ioun, -ione, -yon), 6-7 enfor- 
mation. b. 4-6 infonnacion, (-ioun, -yon), 6- information. [a. OF. enforma- 
cion, informacion (mod. F. information), ad. L. information-em outline, 
concept, idea, in med.Schol.L.the action of ‘informing‘ matter, n. of action 
from informare to INFORM. Conformed to the L. spelling in 16th c. The 
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L. sb. had a very restricted use; the Eng. senses represent all the senses 
of the verb; but the chronological appearance of these does not accord 
with the logical order.] 
1.l.a. The action of informing (in sense 4 of the verb); formation or 
moulding of the mind or character, training, instruction, teaching; com- 
munication of instructive knowledge. Now rare or Obs. b. with an  and pl. 
An item of training; an  instruction. Obs. c. Divine instruction, inspira- 
tion. Obs. 2. The action of informing (in sense 5 of the verb); communi- 
cation of the knowledge or ‘news’ of some fact or occurrence; the action 
of telling or fact of being told of something. 3.a. Knowledge communi- 
cated concerning some particular fact, subject, or event; that of which 
one is apprised or told; intelligence, news. spec. contrasted with data. b. 
with an and pl. An item of information or intelligence; a fact or circum- 
stance of which one is told. In earlier use, An account, relation, narra- 
tive (of something). Obs. c. Separated from, or without the implication 
of, reference to a person informed: that which inheres in one or two or 
more alternative sequences, arrangements, etc., that produce different 
responses in something, and which is capable of being stored in, trans- 
ferred by, and communicated to inanimate things. d. As a mathemati- 
cally defined quantity (see quots.); now esp. One which represents the 
degree of choice exercised in the selection or formation of one particular 
symbol, sequence, message, etc. out of a number of possible ones, and 
which is defined logarithmically in terms of the statistical probabilities 
of occurrence of the symbol or the elements of the message. 4. The action 
of informing against, charging, or accusing (a person). (Originally the 
general sense whence 5 arises; now Obs., exc. as transf. from 5; cf. also 
6). 5. spec. in Eng. Law. a. Acomplaint or charge against a person lodged 
with or presented to a court or magistrate, in order to the institution of 
criminal proceedings without formal indictment. b. A complaint of the 
Crown in respect of some civil claim, in the form of a statement of the 
facts by the attorney general or other proper offlcer, either ex officio, or 
on the relation or report of a private individual. c. information quo war- 
ranto (superseding the ancient Writ of Quo warranto): the step by which 
proceedings are commenced to remedy the usurpation of a n  office or 
franchise. 6.  In  other legal systems. a. In  Civil Law. b. In Scots Law. (a) 
in Civil Procedure: A written argument upon a case ordered either by a 
Lord Ordinary in the Court of Session when reporting the case to the 
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Inner House (obs.), or by the Court of Justiciary in a case where difficult 
questions of law or relevancy are raised before it (now rare), (b) in 
Criminal Procedure: A statement or complaint in writing in which a per- 
son is specifically charged with a criminal offence, upon which a warrant 
of commitment to gaol (sic) for trial may proceed. c. Applied also to sim- 
ilar proceedings in foreign systems of judicature, ancient or modern. 
11. 7. The action of 'informing' with some active or essential quality 
(see INFORM v. 3); the giving of a form or character to something; inspi- 
ration, animation (e.g. of the body by the soul) 
111. 8. attrib. and Comb., as information content, desk, explosion 
[EXPLOSION 4 bl, flow, gap [GAP sb. 1 6a1, office, service, storage, sys- 
tem, transfer, work; information-carrying, -gathering (so gatherer), 
-giving, -seeking vbl. Sbs. And ppl. adjs.; information bureau, an office 
where information is given and questions are answered; also fig.; infor- 
mation officer, a person engaged in the provision of specialized informa- 
tion; information processing, the processing of information so as to yield 
new or more useful information; data processing; information retrieval, 
the tracing of information stored in books, computers, or other collec- 
tions of reference material; information revolution, the increase in the 
availability of information and the changes in the ways it is stored and 
disseminated that  have occurred through the. use of computers; infor- 
mation room (see quot. 1958); information science, (that branch of 
knowledge which is concerned with) the procedures by which informa- 
tion, esp. that relating to technical or scientific subjects, is stored, 
retrieved, and disseminated; hence information scientist, a person 
employed in providing an  information service, or one who studies the 
methods used to do so; information technology, the branch of technology 
concerned with the dissemination, processing, and storage of informa- 
tion, esp. by means of computers. Also INFORMATION THEORY. 
Endnotes 
1. The authors have equal responsibility for this chapter. 
2. References to Greek and Latin sources are not given in this chapter, but may 
be found in Capurro (1978). 
3. Actually, Bogdan himself develops a general view of information that stands in 
contrast to  this skeptical quotation. 
4. Of course, library schools can have a strong focus on subject knowledge. One 
example is the University of Shefield's Department of Information Studies 
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(http://www.shef.ac.uWunilacademic/I-M/is/home.html), in which strong pro- 
grams are offered in Chemoinformatics, among other fields. The tendencies 
within IS are to overcome this problem, for example, by the development of the 
domain-analytic approach (Hjorland & Albrechtsen, 1995). 
5. Other traditions are, for example, the facet analytic tradition founded by S. R. 
Ranganathan, the cognitive tradition, and the natural language processing 
(NLP) tradition. Stockwell (2000) in A History of Information Storage and 
Retrieval has a much wider view of the field than the tradition in IS. This book 
includes, for example, the history of encyclopedias under this concept. 
6. Frei (1996, p. 3) express a similar view on this issue: “For years on end, acade- 
mic researchers studied how to index, store, and retrieve bibliographic refer- 
ences, calling their discipline information retrieval rather than reference 
retrieval. Thus, for a long time, IR was concerned with finding a very restricted 
kind of information and the term information retrieval was a real misnomer. 
Retrieving relevant bibliographic references is certainly a valid problem useful 
to some people. But it clearly does not reflect the majority of the problems that 
have to be solved facing today’s information explosion. Business analysts, jour- 
nalists, and scientists hardly ever need bibliographic references for their work. 
Most of the time they need facts; that is, direct information about the problem 
area they are working in; oftentimes they have neither the interest nor the time 
to follow up references, get articles from the library, and read papers.” 
The tendency to define information as an object of study of only one group of 
experts has an additional disadvantage. Information science is supposed to sup- 
port the delivery of services to different groups, including astronomers. Of 
importance to IS is how such groups conceptualize and classify their objects, 
how their language is designed, what they regard as important and relevant, 
and so forth. If information scientists isolate themselves from the work of their 
target groups, they risk becoming superfluous in the eyes of that group. There- 
fore, we find it very important that information science does not isolate 
activities such as indexing and retrieving documents from the knowledge-pro- 
ducing activities in discourse communities. These communities produce the 
knowledge that is to be organized in the information systems, and may be the 
most important users of the information scientists’ services. 
This definition quoted from Grifith, 1980, is quite similar to a definition given 
by Borko, 1968. This last reference was explicitly motivated by the name shift 
AD1 made to ASIS in 1968. 
In our view, the computational aspects of “the generation, collection, organiza- 
tion, interpretation, storage, retrieval, dissemination, transformation, and use 
of information” are not specific to  information science, but are to a large degree 
part of computer science; but, of course, these two fields overlap. 
10. “In Shannon, Weaver, and Wiener’s texts the terms ‘communication’ and ‘infor- 
mation’ are often used interchangeably, although the term ‘information’ is also 
used to signify the content of communication. The relative synonymy of these 
two terms continues a tendency that was prevalent before the Second World 
War, as well e.g., in the texts of Paul Otlet and other European documentalists 
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and social theorists. From a contemporary perspective, we may object that these 
two terms now signify different events and research fields. This article pro- 
poses, however, that they share a common heritage in an epistemological model 
that  is still in use today. Further, the ease by which information technologies 
converge with communication technologies and visa [sic] versa, today-e.g., in 
the case of the Internet, which is understood as both a communicational and 
an informational medium-suggests that the issue of defining the ‘real’ differ- 
ence between these two terms is less important than that of accounting for their 
historical congruence in theory and in practice.” (Day, 2000, p. 805). 
11. According to the Social Sciences Citation Index, July 2001. 
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